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Recruitment and Mobilisation 
for the Islamist Militant 
Movement in Europe
A study carried out by King’s College London  
for the European Commission (Directorate  
General Justice, Freedom and Security).
 This report presents a comprehensive overview of the methods through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise 
their supporters and find new recruits. It 
finds that Islamist militant recruitment efforts 
have largely been driven underground, with 
little overt propagation and recruitment now 
occurring at mosques. Prisons and other ‘places 
of vulnerability’ continue to be a great cause 
of concern. Rather than ‘radical imams’, who 
have lost some influence, the report points out 
that ‘activists’ are now the ‘engines’ of Islamist 
militant recruitment. They often draw on 
recruits from so-called ‘gateway organisations’ 
which prepare individuals ideologically and 
socialise them into the extremist ‘milieu’. It also 
shows how Islamist militants skilfully exploit 
young Muslims’ identity conflicts between 
Western society and the ‘cultural’ Islam of their 
parents. Furthermore, the report highlights the 
role of the Internet which has come to play an 
increasingly important role in Islamist militant 
recruitment, either in support of ‘real-world’ 
recruitment or in entirely new forms of militant 
activism described as ‘virtual self-recruitment’. 
The reports finds there to be clear differences 
between countries in Southern Europe, where 
Muslim immigration is recent, and those in 
which the second and third generation of 
European Muslims is reaching adolescence. In 
countries with no second or third generation of 
European Muslims, language is less of an issue, 
nor is the conflict of identity between Western 
society and traditional culture as pivotal. Across 
all countries, however, the environment in which 
Islamist militants seek support has changed. 
Especially after the attacks in Madrid and 
London, open recruitment has become difficult. 
The authorities and many Muslim communities 
have become more vigilant and willing to 
confront extremism, yet there are no indications 
at all that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed 
away. Based on these observations, the report 
argues that the trend towards ‘seekers’ and self-
starter groups will continue. It also predicts
that, given the constraints now faced by  
Islamist militants in the ‘open’ environment,  
the significance of the Internet as a ‘virtual’ 
recruitment place will grow, with new  
forms of Islamist militant activism becoming 
more important.
The report proposes a series of measures 
aimed at countering recruitment. In the 
short term, governments need to prevent the 
emergence of ‘recruitment magnets’ which allow 
‘seekers’ and ‘self-starters to find ‘links  
to the jihad’ and deepen their involvement in  
the Islamist militant movement. Governments 
also need to pay urgent attention to the situation 
in European prisons, which are likely to become 
major hubs for radicalisation and recruitment. 
Intelligence and law enforcement strategies 
have to be geared towards identifying the 
‘activist’ leaders of cells. The report challenges 
governments to tackle the problem posed by 
gateway organisations, and to be clear and 
consistent in doing so. It also calls for more 
attention to be paid to extremist activities on  
the Internet. In the longer term, mainstream 
Muslim communities need to be re-vitalised  
and empowered. Law enforcement agencies 
need to build and/or re-establish trust with 
Muslim communities. It is also vital for schools 
to address the narratives used by violent 
extremists as well as the ways in which they 
are likely to be drawn into their circles. A 
similar effort is required on the Internet. The 
report concludes by saying that even longer 
term measures aimed at resolving the drivers of 
recruitment will not bear fruit unless the causes 
of radicalisation are successfully addressed.
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This report deals with one of the least understood issues in the debate about terrorism and counter-terrorism. In recent years, much attention has focused on what people do once they have 
become members of a terrorist group. Equally, experts have arrived 
at a better understanding of the kinds of conditions and conflicts that 
prompt people to drift into political extremism (that is, radicalisation). 
Yet there continues to be little systematic insight into the mechanisms 
that connect the latter with the former. With notable exceptions, 
which can be found in the more general extremist/cult literature in 
social psychology, scholars have had little to say about the mechanisms 
through which radicalised individuals become members of a violent 
extremist group. There is no fully developed ‘theory of terrorist 
recruitment’, nor have analysts attempted to derive a full conceptual 
framework within which to understand the issue. 
This study seeks to address this omission by exploring the methods 
through which violent radicals mobilise support for terrorism and, 
in particular, the ways and means through which they find recruits. 
Empirically, our study focuses on the situation in the European 
Union (EU), and it concentrates on groups that could be described as 
‘Islamist militant’ in approach and ideology, though conscious efforts 
have been undertaken to situate the research within the broader 
framework of what is known about recruitment into violent extremism 
more generally as well as with reference to groups of different 
ideological dispositions. 
The objectives of this study are threefold. The first is to establish 
the nature of the process through which individuals in Europe become 
involved in Islamist militant groups and networks. The second is to 
trace developments and trends that have impacted on the process of 
recruitment. Finally, we aim to identify a series of recommendations 
through which emerging trends can be countered and recruitment into 
violent extremism curbed. As a result, we hope to provide the most 
comprehensive and up to date overview of the dynamics and structures 
that underlie recruitment into Islamist militancy in Europe. 
The structure of this report follows the research questions and  
aims set out above. Chapter 2 explains the changing structures of 
Islamist militancy in Europe. In Chapter 3, we examine the question 
of where recruitment into violent extremism takes place. Chapter 4 
deals with the agents that are significant in the recruitment process 
and shows how they contribute to the process of ‘joining up’. Chapter 
5 looks at the nature of the message and the (social) process through 
which it is disseminated. Chapter 6 highlights the role of the  
Internet and other kinds of new media in facilitating the process of 
recruitment. In Chapter 7, we summarise the findings of our study  
and develop a series of recommendations that may help policymakers 
in developing counter-strategies. 
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify the terminology 
as well as explain the theory and methods that have been used in  
our research.
  Introduction
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1.1 Definitions
Some of the terms and expressions used in this report refer to 
concepts that are widely contested. In order to avoid confusion and 
misinterpretations – as well as in order to make it possible for the 
report to be read in a focused way – it is essential to be clear about 
how they have been understood by the authors of this report.
The key variable which this study hopes to investigate is 
recruitment. A popular understanding would suggest that recruitment 
describes the ways and methods through which organisations seek 
to gain members or active supporters. In the context of this study, 
this would mean the process by which individuals are ‘spotted… 
monitored… and manipulated… with the final purpose of having  
these people participate in the jihad’.1 However, while this may 
represent one way of conceptualising recruitment into violent 
extremism, most analysts would agree that it is too ‘top-down’ to 
understand the phenomenon in its full complexity. As Marc Sageman 
and others have argued, ‘the process of joining the jihad… is more  
of a bottom-up than a top-down activity’, with individuals 
actively seeking out opportunities to be recruited rather than being 
‘brainwashed’ or ‘manipulated’ into joining up.2 Without wanting to 
make prior assumptions about whether the former or the latter is more 
accurate, we believe that the aims and objectives of this study are  
most likely to be met by conceiving recruitment in the broadest 
possible terms, that is, as the process through which individuals join 
entities engaged in violent extremism. 
Furthermore, for reasons of conceptual clarity, we believe it is 
important to distinguish between recruitment and radicalisation. 
Although the two concepts are related, they denote distinct 
phenomena in that recruitment ‘involves practical steps towards 
[joining a violent group]’, whereas radicalisation describes the  
changes in attitude that lead towards sanctioning and, ultimately,  
the involvement in the use of violence for a political aim.3 Simply  
put, recruitment is situated at the interface between radicalisation and 
the pursuit of violence. It represents, in the words of Michael Taarnby, 
‘the bridge between personal belief and violent activism’.4    
Another term frequently used in this study is extremism. Typically, 
this expression refers to political ideologies that are opposed to a 
society’s core (constitutional) values and principles. In the European 
context, this could be said to apply to ideologies that are supremacist 
in nature and disregard basic principles of democracy and human 
dignity.5 However, the term has also been used to describe the methods 
through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by 
adopting means ‘which show disregard for the life, liberty, and human 
rights of others’.6 Given this ambiguity, it makes sense to qualify the 
concept by adding the adjective ‘violent’, that is, violent extremism. 
Typically, the kind of violence encountered in this study is terrorist 
in nature. To avoid the longstanding (and seemingly never-ending) 
dispute about the definition of terrorism,7 we decided to follow the 
technical definition adopted in the EU’s Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism 8 as well as the United Nations’ (UN) High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes which, in late 2004, proposed 
to define terrorism as ‘any action.. that is intended to cause death or 
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose 
of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act’.9
The actors which this study investigates are described as Islamist 
militants. Based on a thorough evaluation of the literature,10 we believe 
that Islamist militancy combines a strict, literalist practice of Islam 
(often referred to as Salafi or Wahhabi)11 with a revolutionary political 
ideology (Islamism), proclaiming a global community of believers 
(the ummah) to be liberated and/or united under Islamic rule, and the 
belief that the most effective way of accomplishing this aim is through 
violence or ‘armed struggle’ (often referred to as jihad).12 Followers of 
this movement typically believe themselves to be engaged in a war 
against a coalition of Christians and Jews (the so-called Crusader and 
Zionist Alliance) as well as apostate Muslim rulers in which it is the 
individual duty of every Muslim to defend the ummah. 
.2 Social movement theory
The study of terrorism brings together scholars from many  
different disciplines. This allows for cross-fertilisation, but it also  
means that the multitude of prisms through which to look at the 
phenomenon can sometimes be confusing. Many studies of terrorism 
– as well as much of the popular discourse – is based on what some 
experts call ‘strain theory’, that is, the idea that terrorist mobilisation 
is a response to the amount of strains and stresses encountered by a 
particular society: the more people feel frustrated and alienated, the 
more likely they are to join groups that resist the perceived sources  
of their frustration. As a result, many authors have focused on the  
so-called ‘roots and causes’ of terrorism, hoping that it will be possible 
to formulate effective counter-terrorism policies based on a correct 
appreciation of the sources of people’s grievances. Arguments range 
from the role of poverty, political leaning, perceptions of grievance and 
threat, to a search for identity, personality factors and religion, without  
one single factor providing a fully satisfactory answer to the question  
of why terrorism occurs.13
1 This definition was adopted by the Dutch domestic intelligence service in its 2002 study of recruitment. See AIVD, Recruitment 
 for the Jihad in the Netherlands (The Hague: AIVD, 2002), p. 7.
2 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 122
3 Michael Taarnby, ‘Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark, 1990-2006’, Danish Institute of
	 International	Affairs	Working	Paper, 2006/35, p. 62. 
4 Michael Taarnby: ‘Recruitment of islamist terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives’, Research	Report	funded	by	the	Danish	
Ministry of Justice, 14 January 2005, p. 6. 
5 Fernando Reinares, quoted in David J. Kilcullen, ‘Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in 
Europe’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism, 30(8) (2007), p. 652.
6 Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
8 European Union, Council	Framework	Decision	on	Combating	Terrorism, 13 June 2002, EU Document 2002/475/JHA. 
9 Report	of	the	Secretary-General’s	High	Level	Panel, United Nations Document A/59/565 (2004). 
10 See, for example, John Esposito, Unholy	War:	Terror	in	the	Name	of	Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Gilles Kepel, 
Jihad:	Expansion	et	Déclin	de	l’Islamisme (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2000); Guido Steinberg, Der nahe und der ferne Feind 
(Munich: CH Beck, 2005); Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism, 28(2) (2005).
11 Not all Salafis are militant Islamists. For distinctions amongst followers of the Salafi movement, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, 
‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism, 29(3) (2006), pp. 207-39.
12 This definition follows the typology put forward by David Kilcullen in Kilcullen, ‘Subversion’, p. 653. We are conscious that the 
concept of jihad has a variety of meanings in Islamic theology, but Islamist militants use it almost exclusively in the context of 
armed struggle. See Esposito, Unholy	War, pp. 26-8.
13 See Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root	Causes	of	Terrorism:	Myths,	Realities,	and	Ways	Forward (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). 
Also Louise Richardson, What	Terrorists	Want:	Understanding	the	Terrorist	Threat (London: John Murray, 2006).  
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One of the main criticisms of this approach is that, while grievances 
are widespread, terrorism is not. On the contrary, some of the most 
repressive as well as economically deprived societies have experienced 
little political violence, whereas many prosperous and stable countries 
have been the targets of many terrorist campaigns. Likewise, some of 
the conditions which have been identified by ‘strain theorists’ as the 
principal causes of contemporary Islamist militancy in the Arab world 
– the rise of modernity, the aggressive imposition of Western culture, 
the lack of democracy and access, as well as the gap between rich and 
poor – are uniform across the countries of the Middle East, yet some 
have seen significantly higher levels of terrorism and political upheaval 
than others.14 Even some of the strain theorists concede that – while 
alienation and frustration may be useful indicators for radicalisation 
and ‘revolutionary potential’ – they are rarely sufficient in  
explaining why political violence actually occurs.15  
The difference between ‘revolutionary potential’ and actual 
revolution lies in the extent to which social movements succeed in 
mobilising people’s grievances and alienation and channel them into 
concrete action. Though scholars in this particular field of sociology16 
have, until recently, paid little attention to terrorist groups,17 we believe 
that social movement theory provides a uniquely relevant perspective 
through which to understand the process of mobilisation of which 
recruitment forms a vital part. In particular, there are three insights 
and/or emphases drawn from social movement theory that have 
provided useful lines of inquiry which have informed, guided and 
structured our research. 
First, social movement theory postulates that movements act (more 
or less) rationally in mobilising their resources. Depending on what 
they believe suits their purposes, they will attempt to take advantage 
of formal structures as well as informal networks and use all the 
communication channels open to them, yet they will also adapt and 
respond to constraints and externally imposed limitations.18  We believe 
that this way of looking at resource mobilisation offers a useful prism 
through which to interpret changes in the Islamist militant recruitment 
environment. In particular, it suggests that the choice of locations and 
media through which to approach potential recruits is likely to be 
determined by a cost/benefit analysis, weighing the benefits in terms 
of mobilisation against the potential drawbacks, such as attention by 
law enforcement and opposition from community leaders opposed to 
violent extremism. 
Second, social movement theorists pay much attention to the 
process through which messages (or ‘frames’) are conveyed to potential 
supporters: while the content of such messages matters, it is equally 
important, for example, to look at how ‘frames’ are sequenced and 
whether the frame ‘articulator’ is credible.19 The aim of this process 
is to achieve ‘frame alignment’, that is, the convergence between the 
movement’s narrative and the views of their recruits. In our case, this 
requires examination of what violent extremists are saying but also how 
and when they are saying it. We will need to focus on what kinds of 
messages are conveyed at which stage of the recruitment process and 
what role is played by different types of frame ‘articulator’, such as 
charismatic leaders and ‘hate preachers’. 
Third, social movement theory argues that informal ties and social 
networks play a vitally important part in the process of mobilisation. 
For instance, Quintan Wiktorowicz maintains that ‘frame alignment’ 
is rarely sufficient in persuading people to engage in ‘risky behaviour’ 
(such as violence or crime), and that involvement in acts of violence 
tends to be preceded by a process of ‘socialisation’ which alters 
perceptions of self-interest and increases the value of group loyalties 
and personal ties.20 The value of these dynamics to the study of 
terrorism was highlighted by Donatella della Porta in her research on 
left-wing groups in Italy and Germany,21 and it heavily influenced the 
work of Sageman, who applied della Porta’s findings to the Islamist 
militant movement.22 Social networks are likely, therefore, to be 
relevant to our study, and – in addition to resource mobilisation and 
the ‘framing process’ – they will constitute a third line of inquiry that  
will be kept in mind when looking at the process through  
which violent extremists maintain support and find new recruits. 
.3 Methodology
Having outlined key concepts as well as the theoretical foundations  
of this study, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the methods 
and approaches that were used in the course of the research. The 
research which forms the basis of this report was carried out over a 
period of ten months, from December 2006 to November 2007. Its 
approach is qualitative, with evidence based on a combination of 
secondary and primary sources. 
We began our research by conducting an extensive review of the 
existing literature related to recruitment, radicalisation, and violent 
extremism. Reflecting the composition of the research team, our 
approach was inter-disciplinary, drawing on monographs, edited 
volumes and recent journal articles in the disciplines of sociology, 
social psychology, history, anthropology, political science as well  
as the much narrower field of ‘terrorism studies’. 
Empirical evidence was gleaned from a systematic reading of 
published policy reports by governments and independent researchers 
as well as other publicly available materials, such as relevant articles 
which have appeared in newspapers and magazines. In addition, 
we have carried out extensive fieldwork, including nearly forty 
semi-structured interviews with individuals residing in three EU 
counties (France, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Interviewees 
were selected from three categories. We interviewed law enforcement 
14 Roel Meijer, ‘Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement’, IRSH, 50 (2005),  
p. 280. 
15 See Louise Richardson, ‘Introduction’ in Louise Richardson (ed.), The Roots of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 2. 
16 For an overview of the literature, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Doug McAdam, 
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
17 A notable exception is Donatella della Porta. See Donatella della Porta, Social	Movements,	Political	Violence	and	the	State:	 
A	Comparative	Analyis	of	Italy	and	Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
18 Meijer, ‘Taking the Islamist Movement’, p. 280. 
19 See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 2 (2000), pp. 611-39. Also Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause: Al Muhajiroun and Radical Islam’, pp. 8-
10; available at http://www.yale-university.com/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf 
20 Ibid. 
21 Della Porta, Social Movements, Chapter 6. 
22 Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, Chapter 5. 
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and intelligence officials dealing with recruitment and radicalisation; 
‘community leaders’, such as youth workers and imams, from areas 
in which recruitment has taken place; and ‘radicals’ as well as ‘former 
radicals’ who were members or close to groups or networks that 
approved of and/or facilitated violent extremism.
This multi-tiered approach made it possible for us to gain first-
hand insights from a variety of different perspectives, depending on 
interviewees’ relative proximity to the recruitment process. Needless to 
say, the interviews do not constitute a representative sample, but they 
have proved useful in complementing as well as substantiating some of 
the findings that were gleaned from other sources. In particular, they 
have allowed us to ‘update’ the observations made in the academic 
literature, which often tends to lag several years behind. Furthermore, 
it needs to be stressed that all interviews were conducted in 
accordance with the three participating institutions’ respective codes 
on ethical conduct governing research involving human beings.
Though this report claims to provide an overview of the situation 
in Europe, it is not a country by country account. Given available 
time and resources, this would not have been feasible, nor would the 
production of a European ‘handbook’ on recruitment be particularly 
insightful. Our desk-based research took into account relevant reports 
and publications from all over Europe, yet most of the empirical 
evidence – including all the fieldwork – relates to developments in 
France, the United Kingdom and Spain. Though precise figures are 
hard to come by (many EU member states do not hold records on 
their residents’ religious affiliation), the three countries are estimated 
to comprise about half of the Muslim population in the EU,23 and they 
have all seen significant levels of Islamist militant activities in recent 
years. Looking at a variety of different countries has made it possible 
to determine similarities and differences in patterns, structures and 
processes. At the same time, limiting the fieldwork sample to just three 
countries allowed us to concentrate on identifying the key analytical 
variables – that is, the dynamics and processes involved in recruitment 
– rather than getting bogged down in sterile fact-finding exercises, 
producing information that is likely to be out of date by the time this 
report will be publicly available. Needless to say, where conditions 
are believed to differ significantly from the rest of Europe, this will be 
pointed out.  
Having established that social movement theory is the most appropriate framework through which to look at the question of recruitment (see 1.2), we need to better understand the 
nature of the movement and the context in which this theory will be 
applied. This chapter will identify the core structures of which the 
Islamist movement is composed as well as the dynamics that are likely 
to impact on the ways in which individuals join. First, we will try 
to make sense of the multi-faceted nature of the Islamist movement. 
Based on this evaluation, we will then develop a typology of Islamist 
militant cell structures in Europe. This will be followed by a section 
that highlights the differences between European countries and how 
they are likely to impact recruitment. Based on our assessment – and 
drawing on the secondary literature in the field – we will then distil 
a number of key trends and dynamics, concluding that the process 
of joining Islamist militancy in Europe has become more diffuse, 
with more flexible recruitment patterns and less direction from the 
movement’s leadership.  
2. Modelling Al Qaeda?
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, numerous  
attempts have been made to explain what the Islamist militant 
movement – often popularly (and sometimes misleadingly) referred 
to as Al Qaeda – constitutes. In the period immediately following the 
9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda was portrayed as a hierarchical organisation 
with a clear chain of command and control. Al Qaeda, it was argued, 
resembled a spider web, with Osama Bin Laden at the centre and 
sleeper cells around the world, ready to strike at Western targets at 
any moment.24 Quickly, this idea gave way to the notion of Al Qaeda 
as a franchise operation. According to Olivier Roy and Peter Bergen, 
for example, rather than planning particular operations, the leadership 
merely sponsored acts of terrorism, subcontracting them to local 
groups who were given permission to take action on behalf of the 
wider movement.25 Yet others believed it was wrong to understand  
Al Qaeda as a coherent organisation at all. Rather, it represented an 
ideology which could be claimed by anyone who identified with 
certain beliefs. In this view, the movement operated according to  
the principles of ‘leaderless resistance’ in which the leadership  
provided incitement and (religious) justification but left it to their 
supporters’ initiative to act on them.26 At best, therefore, Al Qaeda 
2  The Islamist militant movement
23 See, for example, Jocelyne Cesari, When	Islam	and	Democracy	Meet:	Muslims	in	Europe	and	the	United	States (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2004), pp. 183-4. Also Ceri Peach, ‘Muslim Population of Europe: A Brief Overview of Demographic Trends and 
Socioeconomic Integration’ in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Muslim	Integration:	Challenging	Conventional	Wisdom	
in	Europe	and	the	United	States (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), p. 9.
24 See Paul L. Williams, Al	Qaeda:	Brotherhood	of	Terror (New York: Alpha, 2002), Chapters 7 and 8; also Rohan Gunaratna,  
Inside Al Qaeda (London: Hurst, 2002), Chapter 2.  
25 See Olivier Roy, ‘Netzwerk des Terrors – Markenzeichen al-Qaida’, Le Monde Diplomatique (German edition), 10 September 
2004; Peter Bergen, Holy	War	Inc.:	Inside	the	Secret	World	of	Osama	bin	Laden (London: Phoenix, 2001), Chapter 10. 
26 See Jessica Stern, ‘The Protean Enemy’, Foreign	Affairs, July/August 2003. Ironically, the idea of ‘leaderless resistance’ was 
formulated by American right-wing extremists. See Louis Beam, ‘Leaderless Resistance’, The Seditionist, February 1992; 
available at http://reactor-core.org/leaderless-resistance.html. 
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represented ‘an amorphous movement held together by a loosely 
networked transnational constituency’.27
The three images described above are often portrayed as competing 
visions. In reality, they all represent accurate understandings of 
the contemporary Islamist militant movement. In one of the best 
appreciations of Al Qaeda, Jason Burke argued that the Islamist 
militant movement operated at three levels: the ‘hard core’, consisting 
of Bin Laden, his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri and their lieutenants; 
the ‘network’, made up of mujahideen who took part in jihad or 
spent longer periods in training camps abroad, have returned to 
their home countries and are now involved in local groups; and the 
wider ‘movement’ of all those who identify with Al Qaeda ideology 
and are prepared to act out the ‘hard core’s’ ideas while having no 
direct association with its members and only loose connections to 
the ‘network’.28 Burke emphasises that, throughout the history of the 
movement, the relationship between the three levels has never been 
static. Indeed, he argues that it is the interplay between the different 
levels that explains the changing dynamics of the movement.29 
Burke’s observations are reflected in the writings of some of the 
movement’s most important strategists. Abu Musab al Suri, one of 
Al Qaeda’s leading military thinkers, anticipated the diffusion of the 
movement that took place in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, 
and argued that this development was highly desirable. In his view, 
direct relationships between the ‘hard core’ and operative units had to 
be discouraged, with the only link between the core and its ‘tentacles’ 
being ‘a common aim, a common doctrinal program and a… self-
educational program’.30 Moreover, he believed that the movement’s 
global campaign had to assume a variety of different forms, ranging 
from large-scale insurgencies (‘open fronts’) to local or regional 
campaigns (‘tanzims’) and small cells engaging in sporadic acts of 
terrorism (‘the jihad of individualised terrorism’). Like Burke, Al Suri 
argued that Al Qaeda was ‘a system, not an organisation’.31
2.2 Cell structures in Europe
There can be no doubt that – compared to ‘old’ terrorist groups 
such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Basque Homeland and 
Liberty (ETA) – the multi-faceted nature of Islamist militancy makes 
it difficult to understand how the movement ‘ticks’. This is particularly 
true when trying to make sense of the Islamist militant movement in 
Europe. On the one hand, there are some who believe that Islamist 
militants in Europe continue to be organised in structured cells, which 
receive training and other resources from the Al Qaeda ‘hard core’ and 
rely on its leadership for strategic direction.32 Others, however, contend 
that the Islamist militancy in Europe has mutated into an autonomous 
phenomenon consisting of groups of alienated, ‘home-grown’ Muslims 
– often described as ‘self-starters’33 – who have adopted the language 
of Al Qaeda but act on their own accord. In this view, contemporary 
Islamist militancy in Europe is an extreme, violent form of popular 
culture, which will never be eradicated as long as government continue 
to focus on eliminating the ‘leadership’ of the movement.34 In fact, 
according to some observers, it is the absence of a clear leadership 
which makes the Islamist militant movement in Europe distinctive.35 
As with the debate about Al Qaeda, the different ideas about the 
nature of the Islamist militant movement in Europe are not mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, the two models can be said to represent 
‘ideal types’ which are located at opposite ends of a scale. On this 
hypothetical scale, the degree to which cells rely on direction and 
resources from the ‘hard core’ (autonomy) and the way in which they 
were recruited (selection) determine their location between the two 
poles. Drawing on these distinctions, we believe that there are at least 
three types of cell which can be found in Europe (see Figure 1):
• The first is the ‘chain of command’ cell. This type of cell is recruited 
‘top down’ with the aim of carrying out operations on behalf of the 
central leadership. The recruitment process is led and/or directed by 
a member or senior associate of the ‘hard core’ who identifies and 
approaches individuals (or groups of individuals) whose dedication, 
skills and general profile match the requirements. The cell is fully 
resourced by the organisation, with funding and equipment supplied 
by other parts of the network. Where feasible, members of the cell 
are sent to training camps abroad. The nature of their mission and 
the decision to activate the cell is determined by the movement’s 
leadership rather than by the recruits themselves.
• The second type can be described as ‘guided’ cell. Guided cells 
are largely self-recruited, often emanating from what Sageman 
described as ‘cliques’.36 Through members’ associations or active 
‘seeking out’, the cell manages to establish a ‘link to the jihad’, 
that is, a relationship to a member and/or associate of the Al Qaeda 
network, who facilitates its integration into the movement. Though 
it remains largely self-sufficient, having found a ‘link to the jihad’ 
allows the unit to access some resources, such as financial support, 
expertise, etc. Also, as a conscious part of the movement, the cell 
will attempt to operate within the strategic parameters set out by 
the ‘hard core’. In other words, while the initiative for terrorist 
operations lies with the group, members will try to seek guidance 
from the network and, where possible, submit their plans  
for ‘approval’. 
27 Bruce Hoffman, ‘The changing face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terorism, 27(3) (2004). 
28 See Jason Burke, Al	Qaeda:	The	True	Story	of	Radical	Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2003). A nearly identical typology is put forward 
in the French government’s recent White Paper on terrorism. See Premier minister de la République Française, La	France	face	
au	terrorisme:	Livre	blanc	du	Governement	sur	la	sécurité	intérieure	face	au	terrorisme (Paris: La documentation Française, 
2006), p. 26
29 Ibid. 
30 Brynjar Lia, ‘The al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri: A Profile’, OMS-Seminar	Presentation, Oslo, 15 March 2006, p. 17; 
available at http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00076/_The_Al-Qaida_strate_76568a.pdf. 
31 Ibid.
32 See, for example, Robert S. Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, Foreign	Affairs, July/August 2005
33 The term was coined by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon. See Dan Benjamin and Steven Simon, The	Next	Attack (New York:
Henry Holt, 2005), pp. 27-31.ivre	blanc	du	Governement	sur	la	sécurité	intérieure	face	au	terrorisme (Paris: La documentation 
Française, 2006), p. 26
34 Aidan Kirby, ‘The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of 
Autonomous Cliques’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism, 30 (5) (2007), pp. 415-28. 
35 The evolution of leadership in Europe’s Global Jihad Networks’, Exclusive	Analysis	Report, 21 September 2007. 
36 See Sageman, Understanding Terror, Chapter 4. 
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• The third type are genuine self-starters. Frequently compared 
to youth and street gangs 37, they are entirely self-recruited and 
maintain no formal link to the Al Qaeda network. Some members 
may have limited connections, but there is no access to the 
resources of the wider movement, so that the group remains entirely 
self-reliant in terms of funding, training and planning. Members may 
be inspired by statements of Al Qaeda leaders such as Bin Laden, 
but they define their agenda and the nature and scope of their 
operations independently. The ‘hard core’ will have no knowledge 
about the timing and targets of operations, nor indeed is it likely  
to know about the cells’ existence. 
The so-called Hamburg cell, which led the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States, clearly fits the description of the ‘chain of command’ 
cell,38 whereas the recent attacks in London and Glasgow appear to 
have been carried out by genuine self-starters with very limited links to 
the wider network.39 Nevertheless, even with this more sophisticated 
typology, it will sometimes be difficult to place a particular cell into 
one category or another, largely because – even in well-documented 
cases – the extent and significance of ‘links to the jihad’ remains 
unclear.40 Initially, cells often appear to be genuine self-starters or 
‘amateurs’. With further investigation, however, it frequently turns 
out that members had links into the ‘network’. The nature of the cells 
which carried out the 2004 attacks in Madrid, for example, continues 
to be disputed.41 Likewise, while the so-called Hofstad Group in the 
Netherlands (one of whose members killed the filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh) is described by some as a nihilistic street gang with no structure 
and no formalised recruitment,42 whereas others are certain it was 
a highly networked, ideologically conscious group with extensive 
international links.43  
Autonomy Selection
Chain of command Directed Top-down
Guided Takes initiative, but seeks approval Self-recruited, but ‘link to jihad’
Self-starter Autonomous Self-selected
Notwithstanding such debates, there is broad agreement amongst 
experts that self-starter groups are less likely to pose a strategic threat 
to the government or society against which their operations are 
directed. Because they are lacking access to the resources and  
strategic leadership of a network, their operations will have less impact, 
if they do not fail altogether. According to Sageman, for instance, it is 
inconceivable for a self-starter group to carry out a highly complex 
operation like the September 11 attacks against the United States.44  
At the same time, most analysts agree that self-starter groups are more 
difficult to detect and control than ‘guided’ or ‘chain of command’ 
cells. Having no links to the wider network and no known associations 
with terrorist suspects, the chances that they have come to the 
attention of the authorities is low. Also, with no clear input from  
the central leadership, their operations are less easy to predict and 
protect against.45
2.3 National differences
While the typology presented in the previous section helps to 
conceptualise the structures of Islamist militancy in Europe, it is 
not meant to suggest that the structures and dynamics of Islamist 
militancy are identical across the continent. On the contrary, though 
the networks of Islamist militants often cross boundaries, there are 
some important distinctions which result from the diverse nature of 
European Muslim communities. Indeed, as we will show throughout 
this report, these differences are highly significant when it comes to  
the question of how individuals are recruited from local European 
Muslim populations. 
When dissecting the nature and the dynamics of European Muslim 
communities, two significant variables emerge. The first is the region 
from which the majority of the Muslim population in a country 
emigrated. While most Turks settled in Germany, the majority of 
North Africans went to southern European countries (initially France, 
more recently also Spain and Italy). Most South Asians moved to 
Britain.46  The consequences of these different patterns of migration 
are manifold. They mean, for example, that the Muslim population 
in countries like France, Italy and Spain can access Arabic language 
writings and media, whereas their co-religionists in Germany and 
Britain cannot. They also imply that the spill-over from conflicts 
outside of Europe – Algeria, Kashmir, etc. – has affected European 
countries unevenly. In addition, and more generally, they have resulted 
in local Muslim populations with vastly different attitudes on a whole 
range of issues, such as the right to conversion, conflicts between 
religious and secular law, etc.47   
The second variable is the history of immigration. In many 
European countries – Germany, France and the UK, for example –  
the largest wave of Muslim immigration occurred during the post-war 
economic boom, with the first generation settling in Europe in the 
1950s and 1960s (and their families following them in the 1970s). In 
others – especially Spain and Italy – a significant Muslim population 
37 See, for example, Lorenzo Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe’, Studies	in	Conflict	and	
Terrorism, 30 (7) (2007), pp. 579-92. Also Yassin Musharbash, Die	neue	Al-Qaida (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 2006),  
pp. 245-51.
38 See Report of the National	Commission	on	Terrorist	Attacks	upon	the	United	States; available at http://www.9 11commission.gov/
report/911Report.pdf. 
39 See Shiraz Maher, ‘Glasgow bombs: the doctor I new’, New Statesman, 5 July 2007. Recently, however, there was some 
speculation that some of the attackers were linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq. See Raymond Bonner, Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, 
‘British Inquiry of Failed Plots Points to Iraq’s Qaeda Group’, New York Times, 14 December 2007.  
40 For examples, see Petter Nesser, ‘Jihad in Europe: Recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe’, OMS-Seminar	Presentation, Oslo, 
15 March 2006, p. 17; available at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFI-prosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/. 
41 See Javier Jordan, ‘Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (2005), pp. 169-91; and Lorenzo 
Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2006), Chapter 11. 
42 See Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’. 
43 Petter Nesser, ‘Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on 
Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29(4) (2006), p. 336.
Figure	1:	Cell	Typology
44 Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 160.
45 Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.   
46 The Netherlands are unique in being the recipient of immigrants from all three regions. Scandinavian countries have seen 
significant immigration from Arab countries. For a full breakdown, see Peach, ‘Muslim population of Europe’, p. 12. 
47 Jytte Klausen, The	Islamic	Challenge:	Politics	and	Religion	in	Western	Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 157,  
192, 220. 
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only emerged in the 1990s.48 As a result, the emotional and political 
‘centre of gravity’ for many Muslims in countries like Spain and Italy 
still lies across the Mediterranean. In contrast, many young second or 
third generation European Muslims in, say, France and the UK are said 
to experience a conflict of identity: born and raised in Europe, they no 
longer identify with the country and/or culture in which their parents 
or grandparents were brought up, yet they also feel excluded from 
Western society, which still perceives them as foreigners. For them, 
the idea of becoming ‘citizens’ of the ummah – a virtual Islamic nation 
removed from territory and national culture – may be more attractive 
than for first generation immigrants.49  
These differences between European Muslim populations are 
reflected in the kinds of Islamist militant structures which have 
emerged in European countries. In France, for example, the origins of 
the Islamist militant movement can be traced back to the Algerian civil 
war in the 1990s, when the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) first used 
France for logistical support and then declared the country a legitimate 
target. The structures set up during this period served as the basis for 
the extensive network established by the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC), which split from the GIA and subsequently 
sought closer links to Al Qaeda.50 The GSPC’s recent identification 
with Al Qaeda made it possible for existing GSPC structures to be used 
for channelling recruits to Chechnya and Iraq. The group’s adoption 
of a global agenda has also attracted more young, second or third 
generation French Muslims, who are complementing older ‘veterans’ 
(now in their late 30s or early 40s) in ‘guided cells’.51
Britain, for some time, served as a refuge for Islamist militants  
from across the world, including associates of the GIA. Even so, earlier 
than in France, much of the discourse was directed at mobilising 
second and third generation Muslims. Furthermore, the mostly South 
Asian background of the British Muslim community meant that the 
so-called ‘Pakistan connection’ – the existence of militant training 
camps in Pakistan and (pre-2001) Afghanistan – has been instrumental 
in driving the emergence of Islamist militant structures, and has on 
numerous occasions provided self-starters with ‘links to the jihad’. In 
turn, the linkage to Iraq is less significant than in the case of France. 
While there can be no doubt that the issue radicalised many British 
Muslims, very few managed to reach the country, because facilities 
and training camps for non-Arabic speakers in Iraq are limited.52
The structures in Spain appear to be the most confusing. Originally 
held together by a small group of Syrians with direct links to the Al 
Qaeda leadership, the recent influx of Muslims from the Maghreb, 
especially Morocco, meant that the Islamist militant movement in 
Spain has come to be dominated by individuals associated with the 
Algerian GSPC and, increasingly, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant 
Group (GICM). While there is no second or even third generation 
of Spanish Muslims to appeal to, the adoption of a global agenda by 
Maghrebian groups led to the structures becoming more mixed. Most 
Islamist militant cells in Spain tended to be ethnically homogenous 
with a clear focus on – and firm linkages to – the ‘struggle’ in 
members’ country of origin, yet this is no longer the case. In recent 
years, Spanish cells have played a significant role in facilitating the 
supply of recruits to Iraq, and they are now closely integrated into the 
continental networks which span much of continental Europe.53
2.4 Trends and dynamics
It has become a cliché to describe the Islamist militant movement 
as ‘flexible’, ‘highly adaptive’ and ‘constantly changing’. Rarely, 
however, are these statements corroborated with evidence that would 
make sense of the extent, direction and drivers which underlie such 
developments. Amongst all the authors cited in this chapter, the  
notion that – in the course of the past years – there has been an 
increase in self-starter groups whilst ‘chain of command’ cells have 
become the exception is widespread. Increasingly, therefore, Islamist 
militancy in Europe is believed to consist of self-selected, multi-ethnic 
‘local networks’ that have little or no connection to the Al Qaeda 
‘hard core’. Recruits are also said to be younger, with converts playing 
an increasingly important role.54  
If the analysts are correct, what would explain the trend away  
from ‘chain of command’ cells? Drawing on the literature as well as  
the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, it 
becomes possible to make two observations, which may turn out to  
be essential in understanding the driving forces underlying the 
evolution of Islamist militant mobilisation and recruitment in Europe. 
First, since 2001, Al Qaeda has been confronted with a more 
hostile environment in which the creation of ‘chain of command’ 
cells has become costly, if not entirely impossible. Internationally, the 
invasion of Afghanistan has eliminated the safe haven from which the 
organisation could direct the global movement. Whilst some of these 
structures may now have resurfaced in the tribal areas of Pakistan,55 
the ‘hard core’ remains isolated and continues to find it hard to 
provide strategic and operational leadership. At the domestic level, 
more attention has been paid to Islamist militant activities by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. As a result, efforts to conduct 
top-down recruitment by known members of the pre-2001 Al Qaeda 
network have been prevented, and overt places of congregation for 
extremists have been closed down or ‘cleaned up’.   
Second, over the same period, moves towards more self-reliance and 
self-recruitment have been encouraged by necessity and opportunity. 
48 See Jorgen Nielsen, Muslims	in	Western	Europe, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
49 See Olivier Roy, Globalized	Islam:	The	Search	for	a	New	Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 117-47. Also 
Jessica Stern, ‘Culture’ in Club de Madrid, Addressing the Root Causes of Terrorism (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005), pp. 35-6.
50 In 2006, it merged with Al Qaeda and now calls itself Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. See Kathryn Haahr, ‘GSPC Joins al-Qaeda and 
France Becomes Top Enemy, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, 26 September 2006. For the significance of the GSPC network, see 
‘L’argumentaire islamiste contre la France’, Le	Monde, 23 December 2005; also ‘Lutte antiterroriste: le projet de loi est-il adapté 
à la menace?’, Le	Monde, 26 October 2005.   
51 Annouar Boukhars, ‘Islam, Jihadism and Depolitization in the French Banlieues’, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 21 September 
2006.  
52 Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.
53 Fernando Reinares, ‘What Threat Does Jihadist Terrorism Currently Pose to Spain?’, Análisis del Real Instituto, 2 April 2007;  
available at http://www.realintitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/1117imp.asp; also Javier Jordán and Robert Wesley, ‘After 3/11:  
The Evolution of Jihadist Networks in Spain’, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 12 January 2006. 
54 See Petter Nesser, ‘Local Networks and Recruitment for the Jihad’, paper delivered at the conference on ‘Best Practices in 
European Counter Terrorism’, Swedish National Defence College Stockholm, 1 November 2006; available at http://www.mil.no/felles/
ffi/start/FFI-prosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/. Some analysts, however, maintain that there were attempts to 
revive a ‘more systematic and strategic’ approach in the aftermath of the Iraq war. See Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’. 
55 Senior member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), private conversation in October 2006. Also Mark Mazzetti and David Rhode, 
‘Signs of Qaeda resurgence’, New York Times, 19 February 2007.
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On the one hand, the demand to engage in Islamist militancy has risen 
significantly, with many European countries reporting a steep rise in 
the number of individuals who are considered to be ‘potentially violent 
extremists’.56 If we assume the number of ‘links to the jihad’ to have 
remained constant, existing structures would have been overwhelmed 
by the rise in demand, so that many aspiring militants had no choice 
but to become self-starters. Furthermore, new technologies, such 
as the Internet, have made it more convenient as well as less risky 
for potential recruits to find like-minded individuals, pursue ‘frame 
alignment’ and maintain social networks within the Islamist  
militant milieu.  
In principle, therefore, there seem to be powerful reasons to assume 
that the drivers behind Islamist militant mobilisation and recruitment 
in Europe have changed significantly in the period since 2001. Based 
on our evaluation, it is reasonable to suspect that the process of joining 
the movement has become more diffuse, with less direction from 
abroad, more flexible recruitment practices and varying organisational 
forms and patterns. Indeed, it is this process of diffusion and its 
consequences which the following chapters aim to substantiate.
 
The first question we hope to answer is whether there are  any places or locations in which recruitment is more likely to take place than in others. Media reports often create the 
impression that there are specific ‘recruitment grounds’ in which 
‘spotters’ lurk for their victims, and that such places simply need to 
be closed down or ‘cleaned up’ in order to eliminate the threat from 
violent extremism. This may, to some extent, be true for recruitment 
‘magnets’, such as ‘radical mosques’, which attract ‘seekers’ from 
a wider geographical areas. Generally, though, the reality is more 
complex. Our research suggests that there are two kinds of physical 
environment in which recruitment into Islamist militancy takes 
place. The first are places where Muslims meet and congregate, most 
prominently of course mosques which will be explored in the first 
section of this chapter. The second are locations in which individuals 
are likely to be vulnerable and may thus be receptive to the appeal of 
violent extremists. The prime example of this second type of place  
are prisons, which will be examined in the second section. Other 
locations that have been found to play a role in recruitment tend to  
fall into the first or the second category. Indeed, as the third section 
will demonstrate, the nature of the place is often secondary to the 
personal relationship that is being formed.
3. Mosques
Unlike most Christian churches, mosques play an integral part in  
the day to day lives of Muslim communities. They are not just centres 
for worship and spiritual enrichment, but they host educational 
activities, perform welfare functions and serve as a gathering place 
for different generations. Though supervised by a committee and 
managed by an imam (who is usually the committee’s employee), 
many mosques are open to different groups and associations who may 
use the facilities as a venue for their own events and activities. Given 
the centrality of the mosque in Muslim community life, it is logical 
that violent extremists have tried to exploit mosques as a place in 
which to find support and recruit followers. Simply put, there is no 
better and no more obvious place in which to meet large numbers  
of devout Muslims, who could be open to the religiously framed  
political message which Islamist militants hope to convey.
Until recently, the objective of Islamist militants was to control 
certain mosques and turn them into hubs of extremist activity. In its 
2002 study, the Dutch domestic intelligence service asserted that 
extremists were trying to take over mosques as ‘safe havens’ from 
which to arrange logistics and raise funds for active mujahideen, but 
also in order to attract potential recruits, ‘monitor [them] closely in the 
early stages and… offer facilities’ to support the process of integrating 
new recruits into the structures of the Islamist militant movement.57   
As is well-known, some of these attempts were successful, and places 
3  Recruitment grounds
56 See Peter R. Neumann, ‘Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma’, Survival, 48(2) (2006), pp. 71-84. In Britain, for example, the number of 
potentially violent Islamist militants is said to have trebled in the years between 2003 and 2006. See ‘The International Terrorist 
Threat to the UK’, speech given by Dame Eliza Manningham Buller at Queen Mary’s College, London, 9 November 2006; available 
at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page374.html. Similar developments are described in the French government’s recent White 
Paper on terrorism. See Premier Minister, La	Franche	face	au	terrorisme.
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like Al Quds in Hamburg, the Islamic Cultural Centre in Milan, 
Finsbury Park Mosque in London and others became bywords for the 
propagation of violent extremism. These mosques turned into magnets 
for radicalised individuals, who would actively seek out these places 
in order to meet like-minded individuals or get involved in violent 
extremism. In other words, the radical mosques facilitated a process of 
self-recruitment whereby individuals who had already decided to join 
up knew ‘where to go’.58
Where taking over mosques proved difficult, violent extremists 
undertook systematic attempts at infiltrating them. The tactics that 
were used varied according to circumstances. At times, they would 
present themselves as distinguished scholars of Islam and offer to lead 
prayer. On other occasions, they set up study groups in which they 
could propagate their message, hiding their motives and identities 
until personal relationships amongst members had been cemented.59 
Where none of this was possible, they would simply ‘sit in the 
corner, wait for the prayer to end, and then approach individuals’, or 
engage in conversation with groups of individuals who had attracted 
their attention.60 Much of this activity was obvious to the rest of 
the congregation. As one of our interviewees, a Muslim community 
worker from East London, explained:
Occasionally, they would get into an argument with you, or you could 
overhear them talking. We knew who they were. People who’d fallen 
for their message could be recognised. They were moving away from 
the mainstream. They no longer attended study circles. And when they 
did, they started asking questions that were provocative. They became 
argumentative.61
Frequently, long-standing battles over the control of mosques ensued. 
In some cases, the mosque committee took a robust stance, expelling 
those who were considered radicals. Often, however, this merely 
prompted the extremists to shift their activities from inside the mosque 
to the outside, with radicals distributing leaflets after prayers.62
In addition to systematic recruitment efforts, there have been many 
instances where mosques simply provided the setting for the formation 
of ‘cliques’, which would then (collectively) embark on a path into 
violent extremism. As one of the radicals whom we interviewed 
reminded us, mosques are the natural place for Muslims to meet in 
order to debate fundamental questions about religion and society:
The community cannot be dissociated from the mosque as it is the 
geometrical centre of our lives… Within our mosque, we don’t talk 
about political affairs as such… But… the political and the religious are 
inseparable in Islam. So, whilst we don’t talk about politics, the imam 
asks us in his sermons and appeals to take a stand against the political 
aggressions and the calling into question of Muslims in general and  
Islam in particular. 63
A former French radical expressed similar views:
 
How can one be a good Muslim? Must one go to Iraq to defend one’s 
religious brothers? Must they be avenged there? Or wouldn’t it be better to 
spread the true Islam among our ‘lost brothers’ influenced by the media 
which broadcast a false image of Islam? The mosque is the cohabitation of  
a series of questions.64
 
For a former British radical, the mosque was the natural place at  
which to seek clarification about the confusion caused by the events  
of 11 September 2001:
When 9/11 happened, I had already started going to the mosque more 
regularly. I was rediscovering my faith. I remember thinking: ‘This 
changes everything’. But I admit, I was confused about it. I didn’t know 
what Islam made of it. Nobody was offering me direction. I had heard 
about Hizb-ut Tahrir, so I talked to one of their guys at Leeds Grand 
Mosque. He was in charge of the area, and he took me back to his house.65
 
It may be no accident, therefore, that mosques – being the centres of 
Muslim community life – would provide the setting for recruitment 
activities. This, however, is far from saying that mosques are ‘breeding 
grounds’ for terrorists. 
A good case study of how mosques can have little more significance 
than being the setting for the activities of violent extremists is an 
Islamist militant network based in the 19th arrondissement of Paris, 
which initially met at the Iqra mosque in the suburb of Levallois-
Perret. As it turned out, the group became one of the principal hubs 
through which young French Muslims could join the insurgency in 
Iraq. When several French citizens who were linked to the group 
were killed and some detained by American forces in Iraq in early 
2004,66 the French authorities decided to move against the mosque, 
assuming that it was similar to Finsbury Park in London or Al Quds in 
Hamburg. In reality, though, the closure of the mosque in June 2004 
made little difference to the group, which simply moved on to another 
prayer hall.67 Instead of Levallois-Perret, the network convened at 
the larger Adda’wa mosque in the 19th arrondissement, where most 
of the members had come from. A spiritual leader emerged who 
attracted further followers and gained the group a reputation in radical 
circles beyond its immediate vicinity. When the French authorities 
made further arrests in early 2005, Adda’wa came under close public 
scrutiny. As it turned out, the Islamist militant group had been below 
the mosque committee’s radar screen. When interviewed by Le Monde, 
one of the mosque officials stated: ‘On Fridays, 3,000 people come 
here to pray. The rector [of the mosque] is a moderate man by nature. 
But he can’t control everything’.68  
57 AIVD, Recruitment for the Jihad, p. 13. 
58 During Abu Hamza’s reign, for example, Finsbury Park mosque attracted an audience of hundreds of Muslims from all over the 
United Kingdom, with many keen to sign up to violent jihad as soon as they had found their way to the building. Sean O’Neill and 
Daniel McGrory, The	Suicide	Factory:	Abu	Hamza	and	the	Finsbury	Park	Mosque (London: Harper, 2006), pp. 115-16.
59 Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause’, p. 8.    
60 British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007.    
61 British community leader 2, interviewed July 2007. 
62 Ibid; confirmed by British radical 6, interviewed November 2007.
63 Spanish radical 3, interviewed April 2007.  
64 French radical 2, interviewed 2 March 2007.
65 British radical 6, interviewed November 2007. 
66 See ‘Irak: trios Français présumés islamistes détenus par les Etats-Unis’, Le Monde, 4 February 2005. 
67 Vidino, ‘Al Qaeda’, pp. 271-4.
68 ‘A la mosque Adda’wa, à Paris: “On ne prêche pas le djihad ici’, Le	Monde, 9 February 2005. 
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There are good reasons to believe that, in recent years, the role 
played by mosques in extremists’ recruitment efforts has changed. 
First, many of the so-called ‘radical mosques’, which were cited in the 
literature as ‘centres of gravity’ for the Islamist militant movement, 
no longer exist. They were either shut down or taken back by 
more moderate leaders. Second, following the discovery of terrorist 
plots in most European countries, many mosque committees have 
stopped turning a blind eye to the activities of extremists, adopting 
‘zero tolerance’ policies towards recruitment and the activities of 
Islamist militants more generally. This – together with the widespread 
perception that most mosques are now being ‘watched’ by the police 
and the intelligence agencies – appears to have deterred many violent 
extremists from engaging in overt recruitment activities. 
This does not mean that mosques no longer play any role in the 
recruitment of violent extremists. Rather, it seems as if extremists 
continue to take advantage of mosques for ‘talent-spotting’ and 
as points of first contact, but – as soon as such contacts have been 
established – try to move away from the mosque and pursue the 
radicalisation and recruitment of individuals in closed locations, such 
as private flats and makeshift prayer halls. Members of Islamist militant 
groups still mix with worshippers, but – rather than stirring up trouble 
with the rest of the congregation – they will operate quietly, making 
themselves available to associates and befriending people whom they 
judge to be of interest. According to one of the community leaders  
we interviewed:
They aren’t picking arguments anymore. They will withdraw… They will 
not be as vocal and vociferous as they used to be, because they know that 
there is a lot of attention being paid to extremism. By people at the mosque 
but also by the authorities.
 
This pattern is consistent across the countries in which we conducted 
fieldwork. For instance, prior to the March 2004 train bombings, the 
M30 mosque in Madrid had served not just as a ‘recruitment ground’ 
but effectively as operational headquarters for the cell which plotted 
the attacks, with daily meetings taking place on the terrace of the 
building.69 Since the bombings, however, violent extremists in Spain 
have assumed a lower profile. As in Britain, mosques continue to be 
used in order to identify and approach potential recruits, but recruiters 
will do their utmost not to attract any attention. According to a senior 
member of the Spanish intelligence service, the aim is to change 
the setting as quickly as possible, typically by persuading recruits to 
attend study sessions in private flats.70 In a similar vein, critics of the 
extensive mosque monitoring programme in France have pointed out 
that the authorities increasingly fail to capture the ‘semi-hidden places 
of worship’ which have sprung up and operate ‘below the radar of the 
state surveillance system’.71 Regarding mosques, therefore, one may 
conclude that a higher degree of vigilance by the authorities and the 
mosques themselves has driven extremist recruitment ‘underground’. 
 
3.2 Prisons
While the role of mosques in Islamist militant recruitment seems to 
have decreased, the opposite is true for prisons. At first, the statement 
sounds paradoxical: whereas mosques might well be the least 
controllable public environment, prisons are – by definition – confined 
spaces in which access and movement are tightly restricted. Yet, as 
the growing body of literature on Islam in European prisons suggests, 
prisons are also a highly – some would say, uniquely – conducive 
environment for radicalisation and recruitment.72 We believe that this 
situation is likely to continue, if not deteriorate.
Some of the basic points emerging from the literature on Islam and 
European prisons are worth reiterating. First, prisons are unsettling 
environments in which individuals are confronted with existential 
questions in particularly intensive ways. This explains why the rate 
of religious conversions in prison is higher than among the general 
population: religion provides a sense of certainty and security, and it 
also offers the chance for a break with the past. Second, conversions 
towards Islam by non-practicing Muslims (becoming ‘born-again 
Muslims’)73 or by individuals from other religious backgrounds far 
outnumber conversions towards other faiths. This was illustrated by 
one of our interviewees:
So, they are in prison, they are coming into prison… some as Muslims, 
some as Church of England, some with no religion, some as Roman 
Catholic. And once they are in there, they are changing into Islam. We 
are not getting anybody changing to Church of England, we aren’t getting 
anybody going to Christian, but everybody is becoming Islamic and there 
has be a reason behind that. And I know that it is a growth religion, the 
only growth religion that is going, but somebody is convincing these people 
who have lived by no laws whatsoever, who have not had any reasons to  
go to church in their lives, who couldn’t care less about anything, couldn’t 
care less about religion. Inside weeks, they are raving about Islam. So  
what has the power of Islam got? 74
 
Some of the experts believe that the popularity of Islam among 
prisoners can be explained by its simplicity and the relative ease 
with which one can declare oneself to be a Muslim.75 Others contend 
that Islam has become a symbol of anti-systemic defiance, and that 
converting to Islam constitutes an act of rebellion. In the words of 
Farhad Khosrokhavar, ‘Islam is becoming in Europe, especially  
France, the religion of the repressed, what Marxism was in Europe  
at one time’.76
Against this background, many prisons across Europe have seen the 
formation of radical Islamic groups, which adhere to the rhetoric and 
strict behavioural codes of the Islamist militant movement. Arguably, 
these groups are successful because they manage to exploit the 
69 Juzgado Central de Instrucción Número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April 2006, p. 1219. . 
70 Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.
71 See Pascale Combelles Siegel, ‘An Inside Look at France’s Mosque Surveillance Program’, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor,  
16 August 2007.
72 See, for example, James A. Beckford, Daniele Joly and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Muslims	in	Prison:	Challenges	and	Change	in	Britain	and	
France (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Jean-Luc Marret (ed.), Les	fabriques	du	jihad (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).   
73 Olivier Roy, ‘Terrorism and Deculturation’ in Richardson, Roots of Terrorism, p. 162
74 British official 2, interviewed September 2007. 
75 Beckford, cited in ‘Islamic raidcalization in Europe’s jails?’, MSNBC.com, 8 July 2006.  
76 Khosrokhavar, cited in Craig S. Smith, ‘French Prisons – Radicalizing large Muslim populations’, New York Times, 20 December 2004. 
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unsettling conditions imposed by the prison environment. Joining an 
Islamic group satisfies individuals’ urgent need for a social network in 
a situation in which – at least initially – they are completely on their 
own: it allows them to avoid isolation, and it prevents them from being 
picked on by other groups. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, 
the Islamic identity of these groups provides members with a unique 
sense of strength and superiority. They can boast of being on a mission, 
having abandoned their (often wretched) past in return for a higher 
duty. However, far from being compliant, their newfound identity 
appears to make them even more vociferous in their defiance of the 
system. Indeed, it is their quiet aggression combined with the use of 
jihadist rhetoric that makes them feared and respected by prisoners 
and prison staff alike.77  
The extent to which Muslim ‘prison gangs’ should be regarded as 
fully-fledged members of the Islamist militant movement is difficult 
to determine. Some have no links to any specific group or network, 
which means that individual members are left to ‘seek out’ Islamist 
militant groups after their release. Others, however, contain active 
‘links to the jihad’ which ease their recruitment into existing networks 
and structures. 
It is our contention that the two principal methods in which such 
‘links to the jihad’ can be established are likely to remain a cause of 
concern. The first way of forming a ‘link to the jihad’ inside prison, 
which is frequently highlighted in media reporting,78 is through so-
called ‘radical imams’ (see Chapter 4.2) who gain access to the prison 
environment because they claim to provide religious instruction.  
In practice, however, they pursue the radicalisation of prisoners and 
facilitate their recruitment into extremist networks. The problem has 
been recognised by most governments, yet remedies are difficult to 
come by. Schemes under which only ‘certified imams’ are granted 
access to prisons take many years to implement, mainly because Islam 
is a congregational faith which requires no formal qualifications for 
spiritual leadership. In the words of a senior Spanish police adviser, 
‘Many of these people are completely unknown, and we don’t have 
the resources or ability to find out who they are’.79 Hence, imposing 
certification without making sure that an adequate supply of certified 
imams is available would amount to cutting off religious instruction 
from the vast majority of the Muslim prison population. 
In France, having appointed a national Muslim prison chaplain,  
a certification scheme is now in place. Even so, French policymakers 
have long struggled with the question of whether it was appropriate  
for the state to get involved in the provision of religious services  
to Muslim prisoners in the first place. Opponents cited the principle 
of laicité, but conveniently ignored that this had not prevented the 
appointment of nearly 800 clerics responsible for the welfare of 
Christian prisoners. With more than fifty per cent of the French 
prison population estimated to be Muslim and fewer than 100 imams 
currently in place, it will take several years until the demand is met.80 
On the other hand, where no certification schemes are in place, the 
ability to monitor Islamic religious instruction in prisons remains 
limited. As several of our interviewees pointed out, prison staff are 
not always sufficiently trained to spot radicalisation or recruitment, 
and will – for good reasons – be reluctant to interfere with religious 
instruction, especially when it is provided in languages which they  
do not understand.81 
The second way in which to establish ‘links to the jihad’ is through 
Islamist militant inmates. Not only can they facilitate connections 
into existing networks, being (alleged or convicted) terrorists, their 
reputation and credibility is likely to surpass that of any radical 
preacher. Referring to one of the members of the Hofstad Group, a 
Dutch prison guard reported that other prisoners ‘adore [him] like a 
prophet, they literally kiss his feet’.82 One of our interviewees, a Special 
Branch officer from the North of England, confirmed this impression, 
noting that Islamist militants enter prison ‘with a certain amount of 
notoriety. They come in there as heroes’.83 
With growing numbers, the problem is likely to get more acute. 
Other than France, no European Union country had an Islamist 
militant prisoner population of any significance prior to 11 September 
2001. Within just a few years, the numbers rose to triple-digit figures 
in countries like Spain and Britain,84 and – with no sudden change 
in the overall situation – they will increase further. As several of our 
interviewees stressed, while much of the resources are currently 
devoted to monitoring the most notorious inmates, the prison systems 
have no capacity to control the activities of those convicted for lesser 
offences, some of whom are certain to engage in radicalisation and 
recruitment amongst the general prison population. Yet, in our view, 
it is precisely this second category of prisoners – those who will be 
released within a relatively short period of time, that is, two or three 
years – that would merit the greatest attention. In the short term, 
the solution may well be to concentrate Islamist militants in specific 
prisons and isolate them from the rest of the prison population, though 
even advocates of this approach (known as ‘concentrate and isolate’) 
concede that, in the longer term, creating ‘jihadist’ prisons will be 
counter-productive and provide Islamist militants with a focus for their 
efforts to portray European governments as ‘anti-Muslim’.85 
3.3 Other locations
Recruitment into Islamist militant structures occurs not just in prisons 
and mosques. As mentioned, recruitment can take place anywhere, 
though – in addition to so-called recruitment ‘magnets’ which are 
sought out by radicalised individuals who are actively looking for 
77 British official 1, interviewed August 2007; British official 2, interviewed September 2007.   
78 For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a number of prison imams were suspended for ‘unprofessional behaviour’ in the 
UK after it emerged that they had been spreading the message of the radical cleric Abu Hamza. This included the prison imams 
at Feltham Young Offenders’ Institution, where Richard Reid – the so-called ‘shoe bomber’ had been radicalised. See Alan Travis 
and Audrey Gillan, ‘Bomb suspect “became a militant” in prison’, The	Guardian, 28 July 2005. 
79 Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007. 
80 Dominique Gaulme, ‘Islam en prison: missions d’urgence pour aumôniers musulmans’, Le	Figaro, 12 January 2007.    
81 Spanish official 3, interviewed September 2007; British official 4, interviewed July 2007.
82 Cited in Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, p. 588. 
83 British official 2, interviewed September 2007.  
84 For a snapshot of the situation in Spain, see ‘139 islamistas en las cárceles’, El País, 28 October 2007. For a summary of an  
internal report of the Spanish Director General of Prisons, see ‘Prisiones estima que el 50% de los musulanes…’, El	Confidencial,  
30 June 2005.
85 Fernando Reinares, ‘Prisons and Radicalisation’; paper delivered at ‘Youth Radicalisation’ workshop organised by the Global	Institute	
for Counterterrorism, Rome, 11 July 2007. 
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opportunities to ‘join up’ – most of the places that have been found 
to play a role in Islamist militant recruitment in Europe can be placed 
into one of two broad categories (see Figure 2). 
On the one hand, Islamist militants take advantage of places in 
which individuals are likely to be vulnerable, lack orientation or 
experience personal crises (‘places of vulnerability’) – all factors  
which are widely believed to make people more receptive to the 
appeal of militant Islam. This is true for prisons, but it may also apply 
to locations such as asylum seekers reception centres and residences, 
which the Dutch domestic intelligence service believed to be a 
prominent ‘recruitment ground’,86 and Muslim welfare agencies, 
which were thought to have played a role in the formation of the cell 
responsible for the recent attempted attacks in London and Glasgow.87
A similar picture emerges when we look at educational  
institutions and, especially, universities. Much has been made of the 
prominence of students in recent Islamist militant plots and the alleged 
existence of terrorist cells at universities across Europe.88 And indeed, 
there can be no doubt that universities have always been ‘hotbeds’ for 
radical thought, and that – like prisons and asylum reception centres 
– they are places in which individuals are prone to experience feelings 
of isolation and vulnerability. In fact, the pattern is very similar to what 
happens in mosques and prisons. According to Baber Siddiqi, who 
represents the Luqmann Institute:
When young Muslims go to university, they often feel a sense of insecurity 
and so the radical groups provide a social forum and then develop personal 
relationships. They invite you to lectures and sermons and… follow these 
up with indoctrination in your own homes and communities.89
 
Based on the literature cited above, it seems as if most of the groups 
currently active on university campuses are ‘gateway organisations’ 
(see Chapter 4) rather than violent extremists per se. This may be no 
less problematic in terms of radicalisation, but it suggests that – with 
notable exceptions – direct recruitment into violence has been  
quite rare.
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Even so, like mosques, many other locations to which violent 
extremists have turned in order to conduct recruitment have no 
particular significance other than being places where Muslims meet 
and congregate (places of congregation). This applies to Internet cafes, 
cafeterias and fitness centres in Muslim areas of big European cities as 
well as to summer camps organised by Muslim youth organisations. 
The only possible exception are some Islamic bookshops, which can 
be argued to perform a similar role to that of the ‘radical mosques’, 
albeit on a smaller scale. Like the radical mosques, Islamic bookshops 
which have gained a reputation for stocking extremist literature and 
periodicals, ‘jihadist’ videos and recordings from radical preachers may 
develop into ‘magnets’ for Islamist militants from a wider geographical 
area, who will visit the bookshop not just in order to obtain a particular 
piece of literature but also with the aim of meeting like-minded 
individuals. As in the case of the radical mosques, such bookshops 
provide an opportunity for radicalised individuals with no ties into 
extremist structures to ‘seek out’ a ‘link to the jihad’, thus facilitating 
their integration into violent extremism.   
Overall, one may conclude that the significance of particular 
locations can easily be overrated. Needless to say, governments need 
to prevent violent extremists from establishing fixed physical centres, 
such as radical mosques or bookshops, which serve as magnets  
and attract ‘seekers’ with no prior links into extremist structures.  
Other than that, recruitment into Islamist militancy can occur 
wherever Muslims congregate, or where feelings of isolation and 
vulnerability can be exploited in order to socialise individuals into 
violent extremism. What seems to matter as much as – if not more 
than – particular locations are the individuals involved in the  
process. So, who are the recruiters, and what do they do? 
Figure	2:	Typology	of	‘Recruitment	Grounds’
86 AIVD, Recruitment, p. 14    
87 Serge F. Kovaleski and Alan Cowell, ‘British Identify Two “Principal” Suspects’, New York Times, 8 July 2007.  
88 See, for example, Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, When	Students	Turn	to	Terror (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2005); Fidel 
Sendagorta, ‘Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context’, Survival, 47(3) (2005), p. 67; Michael Whine, ‘Islamist Recruitment and 
Antisemitism on British Campuses’, RUSI Workshop on Education and Extremism, 23 January 2006; paper available at http://
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89 Baber Siddiqi interviewed on BBC	Radio	4; quoted in Glees, When	Students, p. 25.
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In the popular imagination, the recruiter is critical to the growth and success of a terrorist organisation. He represents the link between the ‘underground’ and the rest of the world. He spots  
and selects amongs a pool of applicants. Most importantly, he seduces 
and ‘brainwashes’ unsuspecting youth into wanting to become 
terrorists. Sageman – drawing on Della Porta’s earlier research – put 
an end to such misleading oversimplifications. He argued against ideas 
like top-down recruitment and brainwashing, noting that ‘joining 
the jihad is more akin to the process of applying to a highly selective 
college’, with recruiters playing the role of gate-keepers rather than 
‘lurking in mosques, ready to subvert naïve and passive worshippers’.90 
As this chapter will show, Sageman is right in exposing the myth 
of the ‘recruiter’, yet his research may have overplayed the notion 
of self-recruitment. Our research indicates that there are a number 
of individuals and institutions which ease the process of integrating 
people into the structures of Islamist militancy, in particular  
gateway organisations, ‘radical imams’, and activists. Of these, we 
believe that it is activists who will continue to ‘drive’ the process  
of recruitment into Islamist militancy in Europe. First, though, we  
believe it is necessary to situate these actors and their functions  
within the wider communities from which they operate.
4. The role of communities
The relationship between terrorist groups and the communities from 
which they emerge is complex. Andrew Silke argues that, no matter 
how successful a terrorist group appears to be, even the larger and 
more popular groups represent a minority within their communities. 
At the same time, though the number of individuals actively involved 
in violence may be low, in some communities, violent extremists are 
positively tolerated.91 In Muslim communities in Europe, none of these 
observations can be fully validated. 
The key structural driver in countries with large second and third 
generation European Muslim communities appears to be a widening 
gulf between the younger generation and the generation which 
initially settled in Europe. This can be seen most clearly in Britain. In 
addition to facing exclusion from the majority community, much of the 
infrastructure in these communities continues to be geared towards the 
needs of the older generation. There is, in the words of one our British 
interviewees, a lack of opportunities for young Muslims:
What you find is that a lot of mosques are culturally led. They are more 
interested in keeping ties of kinship and traditional values. This excludes 
the youth who follow in their footsteps. Many young Muslims in this 
4  The recruiters
90 Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 122.    
91 Andrew Silke, ‘The role of the organisation in suicide terrorism’, International	Journal	of	Mental	Health	and	Addiction, 4 (2006); 
available at http://www.ijma-journal.com/issues.php.  
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country have a dual identity. They are Muslims, but they are also  
British, with the British identity being more predominant. Their issues  
are not being addressed by most of the mosques.92
The grounding of many mosques in the national cultures of the  
first generation’s countries of origin, combined with the search for 
identity among second and third generation European Muslims, can 
increase the likelihood of membership in an extremist organisation. 
This process of rejecting parental beliefs, which are viewed as 
culturally grounded, and accepting a more universal (and sometimes 
extreme) identity or belief system was illustrated in Jessica  
Jacobson’s study with young, second-generation British Muslims  
of Pakistani descent.93 
The result is that the variety of social glues that used to provide 
individuals with a sense of identity, purpose and meaning through 
the provision and use of formal (institutional) and informal (family/
friends) social structures has come unstuck.94 This places individuals 
in a position where they risk becoming more susceptible to extremist 
messages or getting involved with extremist groups, who offer to fill 
the identity void by providing the purpose and the role within their 
group. Also, this has the potential to place an individual within an 
environment where the social and ideological forces highlighted in 
Chapter 5 are both introduced and reinforced. 
As we pointed out in the context of prisons (see Chapter 3),  
holding extremist views and being involved in extremist groups can 
generate ‘street credibility’ amongst peers, which serves to strengthen 
the ability of Islamist militant groups to attract members:
If someone gets caught overseas because of their faith, they get so much 
credibility and kudos… it’s incredible. They really are seen to have suffered 
for their faith… It gives them so much credibility.95
 
This is not true for the wider Muslim community, who would regard 
such statements with suspicion. Indeed, among many mainstream 
Muslim communities, there is a growing awareness of the problem of 
radicalisation and recruitment. When asked how conscious members 
of such communities were, one of our interviewees said:
Very! There is a lot of internal policing going on in the Muslim community. 
An awful lot. And, of course, they are more aware of the subtleties and 
nuances than we are. And there really is a battle going on in the local 
communities here for how Islam is defined and where it is going, and the 
role of political Islam and the whole question of identity. Are you British, 
are you Muslim, and can you be both? 96
However, these efforts do not always succeed in decreasing the 
attraction of extremist groups:
You are dealing with very tight-knit communities, who obviously wish to 
preserve the good name of the community. And this causes some problems. 
This brings about internal policing… They might say, for example, Mr. X, 
we don’t like what you are saying and we want you to leave. This is good in 
some ways, but it really only moves the problem on [to another place]… On 
the other hand, I can understand why they don’t want to ring us because 
they are scared of the ‘foreign state’. [This] comes up all the time.97
 
The erosion of the social structures in many European Muslim 
communities can also lead to a sense of helplessness, which means 
that people no longer believe that the community can solve the 
problem. Rather than confronting the threat, communities may then 
become passive when faced with the rise of extremist groups. It seems 
obvious, therefore, that counter-recruitment and counter-radicalisation 
measures should be aimed at (re-)empowering these communities in 
order to build social capital and (re-)establish a positive relationship 
with the state and its agencies.
4.2 Gateway organisations
The expression ‘gateway organisations’ is used by journalists and 
scholars in order to denote entities which – though not directly 
involved in the pursuit of violence – facilitate individuals’ path into 
violent extremism. Gateway organisations – so the argument goes 
– form part of a ‘conveyor belt’ through which people are primed for 
their later involvement in terrorism.98 The case against such entities  
rests on three claims:
• Indoctrination: Gateway organisations convey religious and 
political ideas which are similar, if not identical, to those of violent 
extremists. Though they do not themselves act on them, they 
provide individuals with the ideological framework – the mindset 
– which leads to involvement in violence.
• Socialisation: Gateway organisations introduce individuals into the 
radical ‘milieu’ in which it becomes easy to establish social networks 
with violent extremists and find ‘links to the jihad’. 
• Subversion: Gateway organisations embrace values which are 
incompatible with democracy and the full integration of Muslims 
into European societies. As a consequence, they perpetuate the 
conditions that breed violent extremism.
In the following, we will briefly examine three entities which have 
come under public scrutiny as gateway organisations. As we will 
demonstrate, the boundaries between ‘mere’ subversion, incitement 
and active recruitment into violence can be difficult to define.
Our first example is the Jama’at al-Tabligh (Tabligh), which emerged 
in India in 1926 and has since spread across the world. In France,  
it represented the principal ‘fundamentalist’ movement in the 1970s 
and 1980s and generated a relatively broad following, especially 
97 Ibid.   
98 Zeyno Baran, ‘Fighting the War of Ideas’, Foreign	Affairs, November/December 2005, pp. 68-78.
92 British community leader 3, interviewed August 2007.    
93 See Jessica Jacobson, ‘Religion and ethnicity: dual and alternative sources of identity among young British Pakistanis’,  
Ethnic	and	Racial	Studies, 20(2) (1997), pp. 238-250. 
94 Bill Durodie, ‘Fear and terror in a post-political age’, Government	and	Opposition, 42(3) (2007), pp. 4277-50.  
95 British official 2, interviewed September 2007. 
96 Ibid. 
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through its success in ‘reforming’ drug addicts and criminals.99 In both 
South Asia and Europe, a number of Islamist militants are known to 
have had previous associations with the Tabligh, for example three of 
the leading members of the network which carried out the Madrid 
bombings in March 2004,100 and some of the individuals who are 
alleged to be involved in the plot to blow up several transatlantic flights 
in August 2006.101 The Tabligh is a religious group whose core mission 
is to ‘propagate’ the faith, in particular among non-practicing Muslims. 
In doing so, it advocates a highly rigid interpretation of the Quran in 
which followers are asked to separate ‘their daily life from the “impious 
society” that surround[s] them’.102 While, theologically, the Tabligh 
can be described as fundamentalist,103 its spokesmen emphasise that 
the organisation has no political stance. Indeed, when Omar Nasiri, a 
Belgian-Moroccan who ended up in Al Qaeda, turned to the Tabligh 
in his search for violent ‘jihad’, he was immediately told, ‘This is 
the wrong way. The only true jihad is the [non-violent] jihad of the 
Tabligh’.104 Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Tabligh offers a form 
of instruction that is fully compatible with the religious doctrine of 
Islamist militancy, thus providing violent extremists with a ‘religious 
opening’ (see Chapter 5) to be exploited precisely because individuals’ 
political views are left completely undefined. Arguably, then, although 
there may be no direct link, the Tabligh presents the Islamist militant 
movement with a potentially receptive audience amongst which to 
recruit supporters. 
The second example is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which portrays itself 
as a global political party whose principal aim is to unite the Muslim 
world under Islamic rule, that is, to create a new caliphate.105 HT’s 
political message and aspirations are similar, if not identical, to those 
of the Islamist militant movement. Where it differs from Al Qaeda is 
over means. HT’s objective is to gain recruits among the political, 
military and professional elites, who – once a critical mass has been 
reached – are expected to overthrow their governments and establish 
Islamic states.106 Violence may be necessary at some point, but not at 
this stage. Although members of HT and Islamist militants disagree 
over strategy, they are part of the same ‘scene’. As the journalist Shiv 
Malik explains: ‘These people hang out with each other, they meet 
each other. They have arguments, no doubt, sometimes very strong 
and vicious arguments, but they regard each other as brothers’.107 
Most significantly, they try to recruit each other’s members. Several 
of our interviewees told us that HT meetings are often attended by 
Islamist militants, who will attempt to take advantage of members’ 
exasperation with political discourse and capitalise on their ‘desire for 
action’. Members will be approached by Islamist militants with the 
question: ‘Aren’t you tried of the talking?’108 Hence, far from being 
‘noisy but essentially harmless young people’,109 HT fulfils all three 
of the criteria mentioned above: it indoctrinates, it subverts, and it 
socialises members into the milieu from which they are recruited into 
the Islamist militant movement.
Our third example is Al Muhajiroun, which emerged as a splinter 
group from HT in 1996, and was led by the self-styled cleric Omar 
Bakri Mohammed. Initially, the ideology of Al Muhajiroun was based 
on that of HT, yet the group quickly moved towards a more aggressive 
approach, which publicly sanctioned attacks against Western soldiers 
involved in Afghanistan and ‘glorified’ the September 11 attacks 
against the United States.110 An experienced and skilful organiser, 
Bakri managed to expand the organisation’s reach, setting up offices 
in countries as diverse as Denmark111 and Pakistan. Rhetorically, it 
refrained from involvement in violence. However, in contrast to HT, 
Al Muhajiroun actively promoted and facilitated members’ desire to 
engage in violent extremism. Bakri himself represented a ‘link to the 
jihad’, who claimed he could provide individuals with references for 
stays in terrorist training camps in Asia and the Middle East. Indeed, 
Hassan Butt, who ran Al Muhajiroun’s office in Pakistan effectively 
channelled British members towards the front line after the Western 
invasion of Afghanistan.112 In this case, then, the question is no longer 
if Al Muhajiroun qualifies as a gateway organisation, but whether it 
should be regarded as a terrorist group in its own right. 
For governments, dealing with gateway organisations represents  
one of the greatest challenges in the fight against violent extremism. 
Some countries argue that all such entities must be shunned, whereas 
others view some of them (such as the non-political Tabligh and 
the ‘soft’ Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood) as natural allies.113 It 
would be a mistake for the authors of this study to take sides in this 
wide-ranging and ongoing debate. From a recruitment point of view, 
however, it is difficult to see how groups like HT and Al Muhajiroun 
could ever play a positive role in combating violent extremism. 
4.3 Radical imams
The media coverage of the Islamist militant movement in Europe 
has been dominated by stories about ‘radical imams’ whose colourful 
rhetoric has attracted tabloid journalists as much as young Muslims. 
Mainstream Muslim leaders often respond angrily to such coverage, 
saying that the radical imams are misrepresenting the decent, law-
abiding majority. They are right, of course, yet it is hard to deny that 
figures such as Abu Hamza in London and Mohamed el Maghrebi in 
Paris have played a pivotal role in the radicalisation and recruitment 
of the minority of European Muslims who have become part of the 
Islamist militant movement. 
Based on our extensive review of their activities, radical imams  
can be said to perform four main functions: 
109 Nielsen, Muslims	in	Western	Europe, p. 168.       
110 Michael Whine, ‘Will the ban on the Al Muhajiroun successor groups work?’, paper published by the International Institute for 
Counter-terrorism, 8 August 2006; available at http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=6598&str=micha
el%20whine. 
111 Taarnby, Jihad in Denmark, p. 55.       
112 Whine, ‘Will the ban’.         
113 See Zeyno Baran, ‘Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism in Europe: Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir – Allies or 
Enemies?’, Connections, 5(3) (2006), pp. 19-34; also Sendagorta, ‘Jihad in Europe’, p. 67-9. 
99 Gilles Kepel, The	War	for	Muslim	Minds:	Islam	and	the	West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 261-2.
100 Javier Jordán, ‘The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years Later’, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 9 March 2006.     
101 See Shane Drennan and Andrew Black, ‘Jihad Online – The Changing Role of the Internet’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 19 July 2007. 
102 Kepel, The	War	for	Muslim, p. 261.   
103 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, p. 44. 
104 Quoted in Omar Nasiri, Mein	Leben	bei	al-Qaida (Munich: DVA, 2006), p. 162. 
105 For an overview of HT ideology, see Jean-Francois Mayer, ‘Hizb-ut Tahrir – The Next Al-Qaida, Really?’, PSIO	Occasional	Paper, 
4/2004. Also Ed Hussain, The Islamist (London: Penguin, 2007), esp. Chapters 6 and 7.
106 Mayer, ‘Hizb-ut Tahrir’, pp. 16-17. 
107 Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007. Also Shiv Malik, ‘The new terror’, New Statesman, 5 July 2007. 
108 British official 3, interviewed July 2007; British radical 5, interviewed November 2007.
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• They serve as chief propagandists, who make the basic narrative  
of Islamist militancy relevant to the life conditions of a second and 
third generation European Muslim audience. 
• They are seen as religious authorities, who provide rulings (fatwas) 
and justifications for violent jihad – even when they lack formal 
scholarly credentials. 
• They are recruitment magnets, who attract followers from a  
diversity of backgrounds and integrate them into a coherent 
network. 
• They generate networks of networks by forging national and 
international links between different groups and networks, thus 
providing the glue that holds the Islamist militant movement 
together. 
A recent study of leadership in Europe’s Islamist militant movement 
underlines our findings about the crucial role of radical imams in the 
recruitment and networking of violent extremists. It demonstrated 
that ‘radical preachers’ tend to appear as ‘central nodal points’ in the 
formation of terrorist networks, but ‘do not… feature as prominently  
or as decisively [at the] training or tactical planning’ stage.114   
An excellent case study of the different functions performed by 
radical imams is Abdul Jabbar van de Ven, a thirty year old Dutchman 
who converted to Islam aged fourteen. Having spent a year in Saudi 
Arabia, he returned to Holland instructing teenagers, mostly of 
Moroccan origin, on what it meant to be a Muslim. His aim was to 
engage in dawa, that is, to spread the word, and indeed he quickly 
managed to build up a considerable following.115 After the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, Jabbar achieved national notoriety 
when he publicly declared his solidarity with Bin Laden. This was 
followed by a series of television interviews in which he welcomed the 
killing of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh and expressed his desire to 
see a member of the Dutch Parliament dead. Capitalising on his public 
profile, he frequently toured the country, extending his own network 
as well as forging connections with radical groups in other parts of the 
Netherlands. Although he had no permanent physical base, Jabbar’s 
association with the radical Al Furqaan mosque in Eindhoven enabled 
him to ‘hook up’ to several international networks, which were mostly 
led by North African recruiters.116 Also, and despite his lack of formal 
religious training, his views on what was haram (forbidden) and what 
halal (permitted) proved highly influential. In fact, the computer of 
one of the members of the Hofstad Group, Jason Walters, was found 
to contain several chat conversations in which Walters boasted that 
Jabbar had given him a fatwa sanctioning the decapitation of the 
Dutch prime minister.117 Arguably, then, Jabbar not only served as a 
propagandist and recruiter, but seems to have been directly involved  
in the incitement of violent extremism. 
One of the most interesting findings of our research is that, while 
radical imams have come to play an influential role in Northern 
European countries (especially Britain, Scandinavia, Benelux, and 
Germany), they are less successful in the South. All of our Spanish 
interviewees, for instance, told us that the phenomenon of radical 
imams was either ‘negligible’ or ‘virtually unheard of’ in their country. 
118 In our view, an explanation for this North/South divide lies in the 
different patterns of Muslim immigration. Radical imams mainly 
appeal to second and third generation European Muslims, who 
– despite their acute sense of alienation and exclusion – are firmly 
rooted in the West. They articulate their followers’ cultural anxieties 
and provide them with an ideological template that allows them to 
rebel against their parents and Western society at the same time.119 For 
some time, they were also amongst the very few religious figures to be 
able to preach to their second or third generation audience in the one 
language in which they were fully fluent, that is, Dutch, French or 
English rather than Arabic or Urdu.120 In countries like Spain or Italy, 
where the vast majority of the Muslim population has arrived in the 
last fifteen years, none of these factors are relevant. Most Muslims here 
are fully fluent in Arabic, and they are unlikely to be impressed with 
the scriptural knowledge of self-taught clerics like Abdul Jabbar. Nor 
can radical imams tap into any widespread conflict of identity, which 
may take another generation (or two) to materialise. This does not 
mean that radical imams are completely without appeal in the South, 
but it has prevented them from becoming a mass phenomenon. 
Is the ‘age of the radical imam’ coming to a close? Some have been 
jailed or deported; mosques are less willing to provide them with a 
platform (see Chapter 3); there are fewer ‘radical bookshops’ that 
sell their tapes; and new laws against the glorification of terrorism 
are believed to have made radical imams think twice before inciting 
their followers to engage in jihad.121 France in particular has executed 
an aggressive policy to deal with radical clerics. Since 2001, dozens 
have been deported to North Africa. In doing so, the threshold for 
what constitutes unacceptable behaviour in the eyes of the authorities 
seems to be relatively low. Whereas in Britain, only the incitement 
to violence would attract the attention of the authorities, in France 
it is sufficient to be considered as an ‘ideological point of reference’ 
for Islamist militants. Critics have pointed out that this has included 
‘fundamentalist’ Salafis whose views on social matters are often 
incompatible with European norms but whose involvement in, and 
propagation of, Islamist militancy is less clear.122 Indeed, some of the 
so-called ‘scientific Salafists’ whose obligations include ‘loyalty to the 
Prince’ now feel increasingly squeezed between the ‘jihadist Salafists’, 
who condemn their quietist stance, and the state authorities, who 
suspects them of being ‘radical’. As one French community leader 
pointed out: ‘The armed Salafist group [in Algeria] has nothing 
to do with [our] movement. It’s completely different. I read books 
by theologians from Saudi Arabia like El Albani. These people 
understand religion better, this is scientific Salafism’.123    
118 Spanish official 2, interviewed September 2007; Spanish official 3, interviewed September 2007; Spanish community leader 1, 
interviewed August 2007.      
119 Roy, ‘Terrorism and Deculturation’, p. 160. 
120 British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007; French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.       
121 British official 3, interviewed July 2007; also Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.        
122 ‘Red Ameuroud a été expulse vers l’Algérie’, Associated Press, 30 July 2005; for the controversial case of Abdelkader 
Bouziane, see Craig S. Smith, ‘France Struggles to Curb Extremist Muslim Clerics’, New York Times, 30 April 2004; also Keppel, 
The	War	for	Muslim, pp. 258-60.
123 French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.   
114 Exclusive Analysis, Leadership	in	Europe’s, p. 13.      
115 ‘Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven: Jongerenimam’, De Telegraaf, 24 November 2004.  
116 Se AIVD, Violent	Jihad	in	the	Netherlands:	Current	Trends	in	the	Islamist	Terrorist	Threat (AIVD: The Hague, 2006), p. 26.  
117 The transcripts are available at http://dutchreport.blogspot.com/2005/01/chattin-with-terrorists.html. 
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Even in France, however, the government concedes that some 
genuinely radical imams, who propagate and incite to violence, 
continue to be active.124 Also, some of those who have left Europe 
stay in touch with their followers in Europe via web sites and online 
chat communities (such as PalTalk) on which they post sermons and 
respond to requests for fatwas (see Chapter 6). Overall, therefore, one 
may conclude that the space for radical imams has been significantly 
reduced, but that it is too early to conclude that they have gone  
away completely.   
4.4 Activists
The third type of actor involved in recruitment is often described as 
‘activist’ or ‘entrepreneur’. According to Petter Nesser, the activist is 
the member of a terrorist cell that ‘makes things happen’:
He is typically senior to the other operatives, and central to the 
recruitment, radicalization and training of the other cell members. The 
entrepreneur has an ‘activist mindset’, being driven by ideas rather than 
personal grievances. He is interested in and committed to social issues and 
politics. He demands respect from his surroundings and he has a strong 
sense of justice… He has an “entrepreneurial spirit” and wants to build 
something for himself and those he considers “his people”… In the end he 
takes on a “project” for the holy warriors. He has high aspirations, and 
sometimes he has a record of failed ambitions.125
 
This description applies to individuals like Mohammed Bouyeri of the 
Hofstad Group, Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the 7/7 
cell in Britain, or Sarhane Faket, who was involved in the network 
responsible for the Madrid bombings.126 In Nesser’s view, activists 
such as the ones mentioned here are self-motivated, intelligent (often 
possessing formal qualifications) and articulate, and they use their 
skills and invest time and energy in order to persuade others to join 
the cause. The people they recruit, on the other hand, are often less 
capable and driven, and may – in some cases – have a record of 
criminal activity prior to becoming involved with Islamist militancy.127 
Indeed, in his sociology of Islamist militant cell members, Nesser 
differentiates between the leaders, the ‘entrepreneur’ and his (younger) 
‘protégé’, and the followers, the ‘drifters’ and ‘misfits’ which they have 
recruited into the cell.128 
Nesser’s analysis, in combination with other reports such as 
Exclusive Analysis’ recent study of ‘jihadist’ leadership in Europe129 
as well as the observations gleaned from our own research, makes it 
possible to derive three main functions performed by ‘the activist’, 
which underline his significance in recruiting terrorist cells and 
maintaining its members’ support:
• Internally, the activist provides leadership and cohesion. He is 
(typically) the one with whom the cell has originated, and he is 
the person responsible for holding it together – more often through 
personality, charisma and commitment to the cause than through 
religious authority (which he lacks).
• The activist leads the process of cell expansion. Not only is he the 
most persuasive and most ideologically driven member of the group, 
he is also the one who is most likely to have a network of (local) 
friends and associates through whom to ‘spot’ and select  
new recruits.
• The activist manages the group’s ‘external relations’.130 He will 
lead the effort of seeking a ‘link to the jihad’ and – if successful 
– negotiate and supervise the cell’s integration into the networks 
of Islamist militancy, which may transform a purely home-grown 
cell of self-starters into a ‘guided cell’ with access to the strategic 
leadership and resources of the wider movement (see Chapter 2). 
It is activists, then, who are most likely to fit the popular idea of the 
‘recruiter’. In fact, based on our observations of how individuals 
join the Islamist militant movement in Europe, we would argue 
that Sageman’s work overplays the notion of a ‘bunch of guys’ who 
find each other more or less randomly and turn into a terrorist cell 
only when having encountered a ‘link to the jihad’. The idea that 
the relationships between members are based on ties of kinship and 
friendship, and that these precede people’s attraction to violent 
extremism, may well be true, but – in contrast to Sageman – we have 
found little evidence to support the contention that it takes a ‘link  
to the jihad’ for such groups to ‘tip over’ into embracing Islamist 
militant ideology. 
On the contrary, in most of the examples cited above, ‘links to the 
jihad’ were sought out by the activist when the radicalisation had 
already taken place, and it was the activist who then led conscious 
efforts to recruit new members into the cell, such as by ‘spotting’ and 
‘befriending’ people at mosques (see Chapter 3) or by attending the 
meetings of gateway organisations at which potential recruits could 
be found. Sageman is right in pointing out that recruitment is less 
strategic and less professional than commonly imagined, but several 
of our interviewees – especially the community leaders – could cite 
instances in which low-level ‘spotting’ by activists was unfolding 
before their eyes (see also 3.1).131
In this context, an excellent case study, which brings together 
the role of the activist and other themes highlighted in this report, 
is that of a self-starter group in Ceuta, which was disrupted by the 
Spanish police in December 2006. The group had eleven members 
and was led by Karin Abdelselam Mohamed, who had become 
radicalised in prison whilst serving a sentence for involvement in petty 
crime. Upon his release, Karin befriended a group of youths in the 
neighbourhood of Principe Alfonso, a poor area of Ceuta with a large 
Muslim population. The group’s meetings took place in a mosque, 
though they were held outside praying hours and there exists little 
129 ‘The evolution of leadership in Europe’s Global Jihad Networks’, Exclusive	Analysis	Report, 21 September 2007.      
130 Ibid. 
131 British community leader 2, interviewed July 2007; French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.
124 French official 1, interviewed September 2007. Also Jon Henley, ‘Muslims are not cockroaches’, The	Guardian, 11 August 2005.  
125 Petter Nesser, ‘Structures of Jihadist Terrorist Cells in the UK and Europe’, paper given at the joint FFI/King’s College London 
conference on The Changing Faces of Jihadism, London, 28 April 2006. Available at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFI-
prosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/.         
126 For profiles of the three individuals mentioned here, see Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’; Shiv Malik, ‘My brother the bomber’, 
Prospect Magazine, June 2007; Juzgado Central de Instrucción Número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April 
2006, pp. 1212-13.        
127 Exclusive Analysis, Leadership	in	Europe’s, p. 8.
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evidence that the mosque leadership knew or sanctioned, the activities 
of the group. During these meetings, Karin utilised Islamist militant 
videos and songs to further the process of radicalisation. After some 
time, the group collectively embarked on a series of actions, which 
included the spreading of rumours about an impending attack as well 
as the spraying of ‘jihadist’ graffiti. The first act of low-level violence 
was the destruction of a tomb, which was widely condemned by 
the community and prompted the police to take action against the 
group. As it later turned out, the group had already discussed ideas 
for a high-casualty attack at a later stage of their ‘campaign’. Possible 
targets included a shopping mall, a fuel depot and a fairground. For 
this purpose, Karin had sought to re-establish contact with a ‘link to 
the jihad’ which he had met in prison and who had been convicted for 
his role in facilitating the recruitment of insurgents in Iraq. Had Karin 
succeeded in making the link, a group of hapless self-starters could 
have been transformed into a ‘guided cell’ with significant potential  
to carry out a substantial attack.132  
However, the dynamics, which prompt activists to increase 
recruitment and/or seek out ‘links to the jihad’, appear to be 
influenced by broader developments as much as they are shaped 
by local factors. There can be no doubt, for example, that – in 
all the countries surveyed – the invasion of Iraq triggered efforts 
to reconstruct more coherent structures for the Islamist militant 
movement in Europe, and that this was matched by activist pressure 
from below.133 In Spain and France, several our interviewees told us 
that developments in countries like Algeria and Morocco are likely 
to influence activists’ propensity to network and increase efforts at 
propagation (which, in turn, may lead to recruitment).134 By contrast, 
in Britain, many of the structures which the current generation of 
activists resort to seem to be ‘holdovers’ from the period following 
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when many attempted to go to 
Pakistan to join the ‘jihad’ against the Western Coalition.135     
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•
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Regardless of such dynamics, it seems clear that activists have been 
the ‘engine’ of Islamist militant recruitment in Europe for some time, 
and that their significance will increase, not least because other actors 
(such as radical imams) have somewhat declined in importance (for 
a summary of their function, see Figure 3). It is activists, therefore, 
against whom the main thrust of governments’ counter-recruitment 
efforts should be directed. In doing so, however, it will be important 
not only to know who they are but also to understand  
through what kinds of messages they manage to attract  
support for Islamist militancy. 
Much has been written about the ideology of the Islamist militant movement. It would be foolish to attempt to replicate some of the work done by other scholars,136 nor 
would it be appropriate given the focus of this study. This study 
deals with the process of disseminating the Islamist militant message 
as much as it is concerned its content. In fact, if anything, it is the 
interplay between the former and the latter that is of particular interest 
to us. Based on the existing literature (as well as common sense), it 
seems obvious that there are four elements which are critical to the 
process of ‘persuasion’ during the recruitment period: identity, social 
forces (group dynamics), politics and religion. In the following, we will 
explore how these different components are deployed at critical stages 
of this process. Our argument is that the justification of violence is 
the culmination of a gradual transformation of attitudes which begins 
with the exploitation of a crisis (or ‘tipping point’), continues with the 
formation of a tightly-knit group, and is accompanied by a period of 
learning during which ‘frame alignment’ is achieved.
5. Cognitive openings 
Most scholars agree that people’s decision to engage in violent 
extremism is nearly always preceded by a so-called ‘tipping point’ 
event or ‘crisis’ which prompts a reassessment of their status in society, 
political and religious attitudes, and even their sense of self. For 
example, Andrew Silke points out that ‘catalyst events’ are critical 
in facilitating the transition from being a member of a disaffected 
group to being a violent extremist.137 Likewise, Harvey Kushner found 
that potential suicide bombers have always had at least one friend or 
relative killed, maimed or abused by the perceived enemy, and that 
it was this event which – in most cases – triggered the realisation 
that ‘something’ needed to be done.138 Drawing on these insights, 
Quintan Wiktorowicz postulates – more broadly – that personal 
crises can produce ‘cognitive openings’ which ‘shake certainty in 
previously accepted beliefs and render an individual more receptive 
to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives’.139 Such crises, 
Wiktorowicz believes, need not always be political, but they can be 
cultural, economic, or indeed purely personal.140  
In our research, we have found numerous examples of how Islamist 
militants have skilfully exploited ‘crises’ in order to produce cognitive 
openings. One of the most powerful triggers in the European context 
are experiences of exclusion and discrimination in Western society. 
European Muslims, especially the second and third generation, often 
136 Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy of’. For various excellent reports on Islamist militant ideology issued by the Combating	Terrorism	
Centre at West Point, see http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/publications.asp. 
137 Silke, ‘The role of’. 
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139 Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause’, p. 7. 
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feel that – despite governments’ inclusive rhetoric – Western societies 
have not offered them the full respect and equality they believe they 
deserve. As one of the French radical interviewed in the course of our 
research told us:
I am a French Muslim… a republican who doesn’t see any contradiction 
with the principles of my religion… [Yet still] I am regarded with 
suspicion… On a day to day level, this is what it often comes down to...  
The fact that, in their eyes, you are a foreigner...141
   
Clearly, this sense of exclusion – often perceived as outright hatred – 
breeds a type of reverse loathing. As another French radical explained: 
The type of person who despises you [hogra] is inferior to me 
regarding his level, be it moral, academic and even material. He’s 
a dead loss, less than nothing. If this person who despised me were 
better than me, I would understand. Then, I would say that there was 
good reason. But, in reality, some of these people have feelings  
of unmotivated hatred that seem to be part of their very essence.
Do you have to deal with this kind of annoyance at work?
I deal with it in the street, in public transport, when dealing with local 
government, everywhere.142
 
Violent extremists have long realised that this sense of alienation  
and social frustration can be capitalised upon in order to attract 
recruits. According to Omar Bakri, the leader of Al Muhajiroun:
If there is no racism in the West, there is no conflict of identity.  
People, when they suffer in the West, it makes them think. If there is  
no discrimination or racism, I think it would be very difficult for us.143
 
It could be argued, then, that extremist movements succeed in offering 
potential recruits ‘identities of empowerment’, which allow them to 
reconstruct their sense of self and gain new confidence.144 And indeed, 
Bakri would tell recruits: ‘Come on Abu Jafar. Your are not Bobby.  
You belong to a very great nation [Islam]. You belong to the history  
of civilisation, 1300 years of a ruling [Islamic] system’.145 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, young Muslims’ alienation 
from Western society is often mirrored by an equally strong conflict 
with their parents’ culture, especially in countries with a second and/
or third generation of European Muslims. When significant numbers of 
Muslims settled in many Western European countries during the post-
war economic boom, they imported the customs from their countries 
of origins, which were assumed to be ‘Islamic’, though often they 
were based on ‘rural-based oral traditions’.146 In the Western context, 
many of these tribal traditions became difficult to maintain – partly 
because they no longer made any sense, but also because the younger 
generation (having received their education in Western Europe) pro-
actively challenged them. This clearly happened in the case of the 
‘London bombers’. According to the journalist Shiv Malik, who spent 
several months in the hometown of Mohammed Siddique Khan:
   
[Khan] felt that drugs use should be acknowledged by the community, 
that women should have access to university education, and that forced 
marriages were wrong. He also made a stance against corruption and  
the anti-meritocratic attitude within his community… Later on, people 
would say that he had been thrown out of the mosque because he was a 
radical, but really it was because he was challenging the status quo.147
 
Khan, like many others, responded to this conflict by embracing 
the purist (and seemingly far more rational) interpretations of Islam 
offered by the Wahhabi and Salafi traditions, which enabled him to 
expose traditional institutions like forced marriage as un-Islamic. In 
fact, against this background, it is easy to understand why the idea 
of a global community of believers – the ummah – appears to be so 
attractive: it articulates opposition to Western culture, yet it also allows 
followers to escape from the narrowness of their parents’ cultural Islam. 
According to Malik, gateway organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and other extremist groups are well-aware of conflicts such as the ones 
experienced by Khan, and much of their literature and propagation is 
geared at providing the religious arguments with which to resolve  
them in their favour.148    
Frequently, of course, rather than capitalising on existing conflicts 
or crises, extremist groups are hoping to induce them. This is the 
principal purpose of the gruesome ‘jihad’ videos from places like 
Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, which are freely 
available on the internet but continue to be shown also at events 
in mosques, community centres, universities and for invited guests 
at private homes.149 These films perform three important functions. 
First, they are certain to provoke moral outrage and produce a sense 
of what Farhad Khosrokhavar described as ‘humiliation by proxy’.150 
Second, they convey the need for urgent action in standing up for 
other Muslims, who seem to be faced with suffering and systematic 
injustices, if not extermination. Third, they appear to substantiate the 
‘grand narrative’ according to which the West has embarked on a  
‘war against Islam’ and – by extension – a ‘war against all Muslims’. 
In fact, it is worth pointing out that some of the ‘jihad’ videos have 
recently begun to appeal directly to second and third generation 
Muslims in Europe by combining the narrative of ‘the Muslim world 
under attack’ with specifically European issues and experiences.151 One 
can see how – for young Western Muslims – this kind of video may 
become a powerful sense-making device: it suggests that their own 
sense of alienation and personal crisis can be attributed to the same 
forces that are causing the suffering of Muslims everywhere else,  
and that – indeed – they are all part of one and the same struggle.
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144 Ibid. 
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5.2 Group dynamics
Based on our research, it seems clear that, in the vast majority  
of cases, the transition to violence takes place within the confines  
of tightly-knit groups, and that the social forces which unfold  
here have a strong influence on their judgement and behaviour. 
Henry Tajfel and John Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
explains how individuals create a positive identity by defining 
themselves in terms of their group membership.152 This, in turn,  
enables the individual to assign value and emotional significance  
to his group membership and group goals. It also brings with it a 
tendency to see one’s own group as better than others, and to  
rally to its defence in response to perceived threats.153 The latter may  
be an important way in which social identity links to violent 
extremism: when a valued social identity is perceived to be under 
threat from another group (for example, when Islam is perceived  
to be under threat from ‘the West’), then those who identify  
strongly will tend to derogate and hold negative views towards the 
group posing the threat. Because the social identity becomes a part  
of the self-concept, then a threat to the group is a threat to self.154 
How do such groups form? Research suggests that membership  
in a terrorist group fulfils the material and immaterial longings of  
an individual, while providing the necessary training and outlet for  
the emotions caused by ‘concrete grievances’.155 For example, the  
group might address an individual’s welfare needs, as noted by  
a Spanish respondent:
There is a small part of the Muslim population in Spain who is very 
marginalised, and they are targeted by radical elements. They approach 
them and try to attract them to their movements not just by sending 
religious messages, but also by providing welfare and – more generally 
– making them feel part of the community. It is in small, closed  
environments that they are invited to form part of jihadist groups’.156
Likewise, group membership may provide an individual with  
self-esteem, as noted by a French Muslim community leader who 
described the way in which a new recruit could find like-minded 
individuals. He said:
He has a group of people that listen to him. So it makes him feel very 
important and very opinionated at the same time, and therefore he has 
some kind of influence amongst a group of people.157
 
In fact, belonging to such a group might be the first time that a recruit 
feels accepted or important.
Furthermore, in the context of group formation, the significance of 
pre-existing friendships and kinship relations cannot be ignored. This 
is supported by Della Porta’s conclusion that ‘the decision to join an 
underground organisation was rarely an individual one. For most of the 
militants, it involved cliques of friends’.158 Her findings formed the basis 
for Sageman’s research, and it was also reflected in Edwin Bakker’s 
recent study of 242 Islamist militants in Europe in which Bakker  
found that friendship and kinship were highly significant in driving  
the process of group formation:
 
If we look at the circumstances in which these individuals became involved 
in jihadi terrorist activities, a picture emerges of networks including 
friends or relatives… that radicalise with little outside interference; and 
that do so in the country in which they live, often together with family 
members or friends.159 
A well-researched case study of this phenomenon are the Madrid 
bombings in March 2004 that were carried out by a relatively large, 
mixed network with members belonging to different nationalities. 
Still, kinship seemed to be a significant factor, as exemplified by 
the involvement of several groups of brothers, such as Rachid and 
Mohammed Oulad, both killed in the collective suicide in Leganés 
several weeks after the attacks. Further siblings included Moutaz 
Almallah Dabbas and Mohannad Almallah, as well as Abdelgani 
Chedadi and Said Chedadi. The latter were arrested before the 
attacks, whereas the former were captured in their aftermath. In 
fact, the Chedadi brothers ran a shop just a few meters away from 
several of the regular meeting places of the networks, the Restaurante 
Alhambra and a public phone booth. A further group of siblings were 
Abdelkhalak Chergi and his brother Abdelhak, who were arrested  
and interrogated under the suspicion of being involved in the 
preparation and financing of the attacks. In addition, the kinship 
connections in the Madrid network also extended to cousins, such 
as Hamid Ahmidan – charged with ‘membership of a terrorist 
organisation’ in April 2006 – and Jamal Ahmidan, one of the seven 
terrorists killed in Leganés in April 2004.160 
As previously pointed out, numerous authors have highlighted the 
similarities between recruitment into violent extremism and religious 
cults.161 As in the case of cults, the radical group comes to serve a 
socialising function akin to that of the family.162 In the words of one  
of our interviewees: 
People underestimate – or rather, people haven’t come to appreciate –  
what it means to find a family again. Many of the jihadists broke with 
their parents, and they were cut off from everything. They don’t want to 152 See Henry Tajfel and John C. Turner, ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict’ in William Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.), 
the	Social	Psychology	of	Intergroup	Relations (Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole, 1979).          
153 Nyla R. Branscombe et al, ‘The context and content of social identity threat’ in Naomi Ellemers et al (eds.), Social	Identity:	
Context,	Commitment,	Content (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35-58. See also Lawrence Kuznar and James Lutz, ‘Risk Sensitivity 
and Terrorism’, Political Studies, 55(2) (2007), pp. 341-61. . 
154 Brooke M. Rogers et al, ‘The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in Terrorist Violence: A Social Psychological Analysis’,  
The International Review of Psychiatry, 19(3) (2007), p. 257.
155 Jerrold M. Post, ‘Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces’ in Walter Reich (ed.),  
Origins	of	Terrorism:	Psychologies,	Ideologies,	Theologies,	States	of	Mind (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 
pp. 25-40. 
156 Spanish official 2, interviewed September 2007.
157 French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.
158 Della Porta, Social Movements, p. 167.  
159 Edwin Bakker, ‘Jihadi terrorists in Europe’, Clingendael	Security	Paper No. 2, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
December 2006, p. 56.
160 Rogelio Alonso, ‘Radicalisation in Spain’, unpublished paper, September 2007.  
161 See, for example, Della Porta, Social Movements, p. 167; Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les	Nouveaux	Martyrs	d’Allah  
(Paris: Flammarion, 2002), pp. 156, 167; Sageman, Understanding Terror, pp. 126-30; Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining’, p. 8.
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leave the group because they don’t want to be pariahs again. So the fatherly 
element is very important... They hang out with each other, and they all 
become brothers.163
 
In this context, then, the purpose of so-called training camps, 
whitewater rafting trips and even paint-balling exercises, which were 
found to play an important role in the process of Islamist militant group 
formation across Europe, is precisely to strengthen group identity and 
inter-personal bonds rather than to convey any skills which may (or 
may not) be important in ‘fighting the jihad ’.164
Within isolated groups, the perception of external danger  
serves to magnify group cohesion, which may – in turn – reduce 
internal disagreements as the group tries to create a united front  
against an external threat. Occasionally, this perceived threat can 
be the only social glue holding the group together.165 Additionally, 
perceived urgency, danger and mistrust of outsiders can together  
lead to ‘groupthink’166 whereby decision-making becomes  
irrational and members of the group fearful of appearing not to hold 
the majority view. Membership in any group, then, comes with 
benefits and pressure, which impact on the attitudes and behaviours  
of the individuals who make up the group. In violent extremist  
groups, these forces are often found to put pressure on an individual  
to conform.
5.3 Frame alignment
The process of group formation is accompanied by a period of learning 
in which the recruit’s mindset is reconstructed in accordance with 
a new set of beliefs. These new ideas are framed in religious terms, 
and this – we believe – has important implications for the process 
and the methods through which they are being conveyed. First, 
they are portrayed as absolute and all-embracing, and they require 
the recruits’ total submission to a new system of rules. Some of the 
radicals we interviewed emphasised not only that Islam knows no 
distinction between religion and the state (see 3.1), but also that there 
is no boundary between the public and the private. As a Spanish 
radical put it: ‘There is no Muslim who doesn’t have any relation or 
at least a certain personal vision that would emerge from his/her own 
[...] personality independent of the religion in a general sense in the 
Koran’.167 Becoming a ‘good Muslim’, in the radical understanding, 
calls for an absolute commitment, and it allows for no questioning once 
the religious validity of an idea or a practice has been established. 
Second, the nature of the religious ideology and practices that 
are being embraced forces recruits to cut their ties with friends and 
family as well as to isolate themselves from the society in which 
they live. With practically everyone else regarded as kuffar (infidel), 
close interaction with society at large not only makes no sense, it is 
negative and potentially dangerous. Arguably, then, the intense in-
group dynamics which Sageman describes as the precursor to religious 
commitment could equally be seen as their consequence.
What distinguishes Islamist militants from other fundamentalist 
groups is their emphasis on armed struggle to liberate and/or unite 
Muslim lands under Islamic rule. It is this urgent need for ‘jihad’ which 
runs like a thread through the period of learning and indoctrination 
to which recruits are subjected. Jihad, despite its varied and more 
peaceful connotations in mainstream scholarship,168 is presented in 
almost exclusively military terms, and recruits are left in no doubt that 
it constitutes a religious duty which every able-bodied male should 
pursue. One of the key points emphasised is that – as long as the 
Muslim world is under attack – most forms of violent jihad qualify as 
‘defensive’ action. Indeed, most of the taped sermons and videos that 
are shown during the learning period are designed to illustrate and 
sustain this argument. Amongst the possessions of members of the 
Madrid cell, for example, the police found numerous tapes of radical 
preachers, such as the Jordanian born cleric Abu Qatada, who fiercely 
extolled the virtues of ‘jihad’ and criticised those who failed to respond 
to the call. In such materials, ‘jihad’ was consistently portrayed not 
just as a defensive action and religious duty to be discharged by every 
‘good Muslim’, but as something that will bring great rewards. In 
Qatada’s words: ‘Those who fall in the name of God and their nation 
do not die, because they remain alive with God’.169  
Ultimately, however, the success in achieving frame alignment 
depends on the reputation and credibility of the ‘frame articulator’.170 
In this regard, many radical imams’ lack of scholarly qualifications 
matters less than one would expect. Islamist militants are distrustful 
of ‘official scholarship’, which they regard as corrupt and little more 
than a tool in the hands of the authoritarian rulers of the Middle 
East.171 There has been a long tradition, therefore, of self-taught and/or 
renegade clerics within the Islamist militant movement. Furthermore, 
converts, second and third generation Muslims of South Asian  
descent or those from North African ancestry whose Arabic has 
lapsed, often tend to equate even the most rudimentary knowledge 
of the Arabic language with great scholarship. As the Chairman of 
Brixton Mosque in London told us: 
[The radical imams] could speak English, they knew the lingo, the slang… 
But they could also delve into the Quran and read the Arabic. Reading 
the Quran in Arabic is like music to Muslims’ ears, especially to British 
converts who are unable to understand the context and who are likely  
to be impressed by people who pretend to be Islamic scholars and who  
speak Arabic.172
 
The Dutch radical imam, Abdul Jabbar van de Ven (see 4.2), who 
described himself as a ‘student’ of Islam but frequently issued fatwas 
163 Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007. 
164 British official 3, interviewed July 2007. Also French official 3, interviewed September 2007.  
165 Post, ‘Terrorist psycho-logic’, pp. 28-30.   
166 Irving Janis, Groupthink:	Psychological	Studies	of	Policy	Decisions	and	Fiascos, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); also 
Rogers, ‘The role of’, p. 258. 
167 Spanish radical 1, interviewed October 2007.    
168 See, for example, Esposito, Unholy	War, pp. 64-70.         
169 Qatada, quoted in Juzgado Central de Instrucción Número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April 2006, p. 1217. 
170 Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause’, p. 5.   
171 Steinberg, Der nahe und, Chapter 2.    
172 British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007. 
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and was clearly regarded as a religious authority by his followers,  
made no secret of his relative lack of scriptural knowledge. He told  
a journalist: ‘In the land of the blind, the one-eyed is king’.173  
5.4 Justifying violence
The justification of terrorism is the logical end product of the frames 
acquired in the period of learning. It is underpinned by recruits’ full 
identification as citizens of the ummah which will have superseded 
their loyalties or attachments to any other frame of identity. As 
a French radical told us, the idea of the ummah ‘transcends the 
individual… [it] exists all over the world and its troubles are felt the 
same way everywhere’.174 As a result, recruits believe to have a stake 
in the conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims regardless of their 
geographical location, and there is no question with whom to side.  
As the same French radical explained:
Every Muslim is angry when the ummah is being undermined. I am going 
to give you the example of the demonstrations against the Vatican in Arab 
countries where French and Danish flags were burned. Western politicians 
became upset about this… [But,] how can you ask me not to get angry when 
the ummah is being tarnished? How can they be proud of their nations and 
not understand that we are proud of ours? 175
 
Indeed, one may argue that – in the minds of Islamist militants – the 
concept of the ummah not only trumps all other forms of identity, its 
religious subtext means that the enemies of the ummah are, in effect, 
enemies of God. 
Moreover, Islamist militants will have been taught that they have 
an obligation to respond to the ‘troubles’ of the ummah, and that the 
religiously correct response to hysical assaults against the ummah is 
‘jihad’. When Muslim lands are occupied or attacked, Islamist militant 
doctrine dictates that the resistance against such attacks qualifies as 
a form of ‘defensive jihad’ in which every individual Muslim (rather 
than the collective) has an individual duty to participate regardless of 
what traditional scholars say.176 In the words of another French radical:
The defensive jihad doesn’t need the fatwa as it is a personal duty for  
every individual. It is a method of protecting against injustices… If an 
ordinary mortal commits an aggression against you without reason, in 
that case you are in self-defence… Why did the French resist German 
occupation? Resistance is a legitimate right. Every people agrees with this 
logic. Religion, the laws, international law, they all guarantee this. It is  
an acquired right which doesn’t need a legal frame.177 
Hence, based on Islamist militants’ frame of reasoning, there is a  
strong and strictly logical case for responding to attacks against their 
‘nation’ by force, and it is equally clear that, in cases of ‘self-defence’, 
no formal and/or external authorisation is required. 
Despite agreement on the legitimacy of ‘defensive jihad’ in principle, 
Islamist militants differ over when exactly it applies and what means 
are permitted in pursuing the ummah’s defence. For some, the idea of 
‘defensive jihad’ implies that certain ‘laws of war’ need to be respected. 
One of the British radicals we interviewed, for example, explained to 
us that there is a clear distinction between ‘jihad’ and terrorism:
I understand the acts of resistance in Afghanistan. They are freedom 
fighters. They didn’t go to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism.  
I sympathise with the people who fight in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in 
Palestine, in Sudan. I don’t agree with the ones who commit acts in an 
underground, a train, a plane. The true Mujahideen are those who fight 
against American terrorism and the Zionists… What some are doing in 
Muslim countries and what others are doing in Europe, it’s not the same 
thing. The Taliban retaliate against an external enemy… In Islam, it is  
all very clear: one does not kill the elderly, women, and boys.178
 
Others, however, choose to disregard such prohibitions in favour 
holding to account all those who are believed to be responsible for 
the plight of the ummah. The idea of ‘Jihad’ thus becomes a way 
of punishing the ‘enemies of Islam’, which – pursued to its natural 
conclusion – may include the civilian populations of democratic 
nations whose governments are thought to be part of the ‘Crusader  
and Zionist Coalition’. In the words of one of the French radicals 
whom we interviewed:
Every individual has his share of responsibility in what is currently 
going on in the world. Who elected the president of the United States?  
The American people. Why did they vote for Bush? They elected him for  
a political programme, and they were aware of his policy. You can’t tell 
me the American people are innocent! If the American state invaded  
Iraq, then the people bear the entire responsibility because they chose  
this programme.179
 
This argument, which uses democracy as an excuse for killing  
civilians in Western European countries, is a constant theme among 
Western Islamist militant. In his suicide video, Khan’s protégé, 
Shehzad Tanweer, applied the same logic, when he stated that ‘you 
[the British people] are those who have voted in your government 
who in turn have and still to this day continues to oppress our mothers 
and children’.180 Khan put it more bluntly even: ‘Until you stop the 
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people [sic]  
we will not stop this fight… Now you too will taste the reality of  
this situation’.181 
173 Jabbar, quoted in ‘Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven: Jongerenimam’, De Telegraaf, 24 November 2004.         
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177 French radical 2, interviewed March 2007. 
178 British radical 1, interviewed September 2007.          
179 French radical 1, interviewed May 2007. 
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Cognitive openings Group dynamics Frame alignment Justification of violence
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When dealing with less thoughtful members of the movement, 
however, it quickly becomes obvious how concepts like kuffar  
and the militant Islamist idea of ‘jihad’ serve as tools through which 
young Muslims can legitimise and sanctify their frustrations and their 
hatred of the societies in which they live. In fact, not only do these 
ideas provide an intellectual platform, they also prescribe a course of 
action, which may result in acts of terrorism. This clearly seems to 
have been the case with the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands, which 
tended to come up with gruesome ideas for how to kill various public 
figures and – only then – looked for ways in which this could  
be justified in ideological and/or religious terms.182 The same was true 
for a group of young British Muslims, who were found guilty in April 
2007 as part of the so-called Operation Crevice. During their trial,  
the prosecution played secretly taped conversations between the 
members of the cell. One of the defendants told his comrades that 
attacks against civilians were justified because ‘when we kill the kuffar, 
this is because we know Allah hates the kuffar’.183 Discussing the idea 
of blowing up London’s biggest nightclub, another member said: ‘No 
one can put their hands up and say they are innocent – those slags  
dancing around’.184   
This chapter tried to explain how violent extremists capitalise on 
cognitive openings. It also showed how recruits’ identity and outlook 
are transformed through their integration into tightly-knit groups, 
and how this process is accompanied by the transmission of a set of 
religious frames which – if credibly conveyed – can lead not only 
to their isolation from society but be used as intellectual tools with 
which to justify, and incite them to engage in, acts of violence (the 
process is summed up in Figure 4). We emphasised the use of ‘jihadist’ 
video tapes, but it seems obvious that the relevance of new media and 
information technologies in extremist radicalisation and recruitment 
goes far beyond the distribution of ‘jihadist’ videos. Indeed, we believe 
the role of the Internet merits a short chapter in its own right.
 
The ‘information revolution’, which resulted in the unprecedented rise of the Internet since the mid-1990s, has been of enormous benefit in bringing people together, 
revitalising grassroots democracy, and facilitating new forms of 
business. Arguably, though, the very same features that have made 
global exchange and engagement possible have also allowed violent 
extremists to exploit the new technology for their own – less benign 
– reasons. After all, the Internet is the world’s most extensive network 
of communication; it is low cost; it is global; it is difficult to regulate; 
and it allows users to remain (more or less) anonymous. 
Terrorists can use the Internet for a wide range of  
purposes, which include attack planning, reconnaissance, fundraising, 
and even psychological warfare.185 What we hope to explore in the 
context of this study are not such operational uses of the Internet 
but mostly its communicative functions, that is, as a tool with which 
to spread information, facilitate communication and – ultimately 
– mobilise potential supporters.186 We believe that it is in these 
areas that the Internet is of particular relevance to Islamist militant 
recruitment. Indeed, leading Al Qaeda strategists have long identified 
the importance of the Internet as the principal method through which 
to create a ‘jihadist’ community and break the monopoly of the 
‘establishment’ media. As Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, 
wrote in 2001: ‘We must… get our message across to the masses… and 
break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement… This can be 
achieved through the use of the Internet’.187  
Before exploring what, based on our research, we believe to be the 
core functions of the Internet in Islamist militant recruitment in Europe 
– ‘Internet-supported recruitment’ and ‘virtual self-recruitment’ – it is 
necessary to explain briefly how ‘jihadism online’ works. 
All the actors involved in Islamist militancy are also represented  
in the Internet. This includes the hard core of Al Qaeda, Islamist 
militant clerics, the ‘strategic thinkers’, and – of course – the 
‘grassroots jihadist movement’. Their roles are varied and constantly 
changing, and it would therefore be mistaken to view the first three 
categories as the (active) providers of information and the latter as the 
(passive) consumers. In fact, one of the main difficulties in combating 
‘jihadism online’ is that the grassroots movement plays an important 
role in producing and distributing information, and that it is key  
to maintaining the decentralised structure of ‘jihadism online’  
more generally.188   
Figure	4:	The	process	of	message	dissemination
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Despite the impression of anarchy, the ‘architecture’ of the Islamist 
militant Internet presence is relatively straightforward.189 First, there 
are the official web sites, representing clerics, strategists, or Islamist 
militant organisations. They are very unstable, but they are often well 
run and may contain downloadable videos, communiqués, discussion 
papers and religious rulings, and frequently also provide opportunities 
for interaction with leading personalities.190 Second, there are the web 
forums which are mostly administered and populated by grassroots 
supporters. The web forums are the soap boxes of the Islamist  
militant movement, where key debates about the latest news take 
place, networks are formed, and a real sense of community emerges. 
Often password-protected, they are also used to exchange videos, 
training material, and links to other web sites.191 The third element of 
the Islamist militant Internet architecture are so-called distributor sites, 
which include ‘jihadist’ web directories, ‘tribute’ sites, and the web 
pages of so-called ‘media groups’. These sites sustain the infrastructure 
of the Islamist militant web presence, as they distribute ‘jihadist’ 
material and provide updated links on where to locate official sites  
and web forums. Web forums can also perform the function of 
distributor site.192 
6. Internet-supported recruitment
None of the radicals or former radicals we have interviewed were 
radicalised or recruited solely on the Internet. Nor did any of the 
community leaders or law enforcement or intelligence officials we 
have spoken to believe that the Internet is likely ever to fully replace 
person interaction. A university imam summed it up as follows: 
‘Human contact is important because [recruitment] is all about who 
knows who. One guy knows a friend who knows a friend, and so on’.193 
Real-world social relationships continue to be pivotal in recruitment, 
therefore, but that does not exclude some role for the Internet 
altogether. On the contrary, whilst pointing out that the Internet is not 
the one dominant factor, nearly all our interviewees emphasised that it 
was important in supporting the process of recruitment. 
There are three main functions of Internet-supported recruitment 
which we have identified in our research. First, the Internet is used to 
illustrate and reinforce the ideological message which recruits are likely 
to receive in private study sessions. In the words of a senior British 
police officer, ‘In the process of recruitment, the recruiter will be 
able to point out Internet sites that illustrate the narrative, and which 
explain what he was talking about in the abstract’.194 A senior Spanish 
intelligence made a similar observation:
After the first meeting, when they are gradually introduced to a more 
private and select environment, the Internet and other media are 
being used to hammer home religious and political messages to increase 
commitment and dedication. The internet gives them religious and 
practical instructions [and] ideological guidance, but also friends  
and support.195
 
Arguably, the very act of participating in ‘jihadist’ web forums  
makes individuals experience being part of a global movement. In 
itself, therefore, the Internet represents – and powerfully communicates 
– the sense of ummah which is the underlying principle of much 
Islamist militant ideology.196 In the case of the Dutch Hofstad group,  
for example, most experts agree that the group would not have moved 
along the path of Islamist militancy as quickly and as decisively as it 
had without the Internet from which members gained most of their 
inspiration and ideological support.197 
Second, the Internet allows recruits to network amongst like-minded 
individuals. It enables them to reach beyond their core group of friends 
and/or conspirators, and helps them facilitate links with other cells. 
Indeed, it makes it possible for self-starter cells to find ‘links to the 
jihad’ and gain access to the resources of the wider movement. The 
so-called Glostrup network from Denmark, for instance, had failed 
to hook up with a ‘link to the jihad’ in their home country for several 
months, but quickly managed to find more experienced militants in 
other European countries via the Internet.198 More generally, then, 
the Internet needs to be understood as a ‘recruitment magnet’, 
which allows ‘seekers’ with no prior involvement to find access to 
the movement. In our view, it performs the same function as radical 
mosques or radical bookshops, except – of course – that it constitutes  
a ‘virtual’ rather than an actual place. 
Finally, the Internet can form an environment in which individuals’ 
commitment to the ‘cause’ and their concept of what means are 
justified in defending the ummah are exaggerated. As the senior 
Spanish intelligence officer told us: ‘People egg each other on. They 
compare themselves to other activists. They realise that a lot more 
people are doing this than what it first seemed. Sometimes, there 
seems to be a competition for who can be the most radical’.199 Though 
much of this is theatre – with the majority of participants in web 
forums being ‘armchair jihadists’ at best200 – the effect for some can be 
one of hyper-radicalisation in which – not unlike the phenomenon of 
‘group think’201 – the most extreme ideas and solutions receive the most 
encouragement and support. 
Based on our analysis, we believe that the phenomenon of Internet-
supported recruitment will grow in significance. Though it started 
to play an increasingly important role in Europe in the late 1990s, 
the breakthrough for ‘jihadism online’ occurred at the time of the 
Iraq war,202 when massive grassroots mobilisation coincided with the 
closing down of real-world ‘recruitment magnets’ (radical mosques, 
radical bookshops, etc.) and the near-universal availability of high-
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service; see AIVD, Recruitment, p. 15.          
196 See Sageman, ‘Understanding Terror’, p. 161.  
197 Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, p. 585. 
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speed internet connections. From an Islamist militant perspective, the 
logical response to this new set of opportunities and constraints was to 
‘go virtual’, and indeed, there has been a steep rise in the number of 
web forums and web sites available in modern European languages,203 
reaching out to converts as well as second and third generations 
European Muslims. 
6.2 Virtual self-recruitment
As noted above, the consensus amongst experts is that recruitment is 
a ‘group thing’, and that real-word social relationships continue to be 
decisive (see Chapter 5). The Internet – so the argument goes – can 
support radicalisation and recruitment, but it will never be able to 
completely replace direct human contact and the ties of friendship and 
kinship through which loyalties form. This chimes with Wiktorowicz’s 
observation that ‘risky’ behaviours, such as violence, necessitate 
social networks in order for the perceived cost/benefit calculation 
to tip in favour of taking ‘risk’ (see Chapter 1). And it corresponds 
with the thrust of Sageman’s argument, who contends that, ‘[f]or the 
type of allegiance that the jihad demands, there is no evidence that 
the Internet is persuasive enough by itself’.204 Indeed, straightforward 
recruitment on the Internet continues to be the exception, with only 
sporadic evidence of systematic recruitment drives.205 Even so, we 
would argue that the idea of the Internet as nothing more than a 
support mechanism for small-group recruitment is no longer fully valid 
either. In recent years, new and ‘virtual’ forms of Islamist militant 
activism have evolved, which challenge, and impact upon, traditional 
patterns of recruitment.
Two case studies may serve to illustrate our point. The first is 
that of Younis Tsouli, better known as ‘irhabi007’ (‘terrorist007’), 
who emerged as the undisputed ‘superstar’ of ‘jihadism online’ in 
early 2004. Having joined a number of popular web forums, Tsouli 
managed to create a (virtual) relationship with Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi’s spokesman through which he gained credibility with other 
online ‘jihadists’. Tsouli also had considerable expertise in ‘hacking’ 
computer systems, which made him a trusted source of information 
for how to circumvent internet security. (He even published ‘Seminars 
on Hacking Websites’ in some of the forums).206 Within a matter of 
months, Tsouli thus became one of the most important hubs for the 
‘jihadists’ online community. He was in touch with several Islamist 
militant groups across Europe, North America and the Middle East, 
and is said to have brokered ‘links to the jihad’ for several leaderless 
militant groups.207 Moreover, as a result of his involvement and 
prominence within the online movement, he seems to have concluded 
at some point in early 2005 that he wanted to participate in a suicide 
attack. According to the British authorities, who arrested the 22-
year old in a flat in West London, he had made plans to blow himself 
up in London during the Christmas period in 2005208. In little more 
than a year, then, he had gone from a ‘nobody’ to become a potential 
suicide bomber as well as one of the Islamist militant movement’s 
most prominent figures. Even more remarkably, his radicalisation and 
recruitment had taken place entirely virtually, with Tsouli acting as his 
own recruiter. According to the journalist Yassin Musharbash: ‘The 
case of “irhabi007” proves that the boundaries between virtual and 
actual terrorism – between Internet jihad and real attacks – have  
become porous’.209      
Our second example is that of Irfan Raja, a 19 year old student  
from Ilford in England, who was convicted of downloading and sharing 
extremist materials in September 2007 along with four other British 
Muslims of Pakistani descent. Raja had not been part of the Islamist 
militant ‘scene’ in Ilford, nor was he known by his friends or parents  
to have radical tendencies. His entire radicalisation occurred online, 
with hours spent online downloading extremist videos, posting 
messages and chatting to other radicals. When Raja declared his 
intention to participate in ‘jihad’, an extremist based in the United 
States put him in touch with the four others, who were based in 
Bradford, around 350 kilometres away from Raja’s home town. Never 
having met each other, the five decided to go to Pakistan in order 
to attend a training camp and fight in Afghanistan. On one of the 
various web forums of which they had been members, they managed 
to find a more experienced ‘jihadist’, who was able to provide precise 
instructions on how to make their way to Pakistan’s North West 
Frontier Province. The plan was thwarted, however, because Raja’s 
parents discovered a note, which he had written before setting off for 
Bradford and Pakistan. It said: ‘If not in this [world], we will meet in 
the [highest reaches of heaven]’.210 Raja’s parents immediately called 
the police, who arrested all five members of the cell. 
The examples of Tsouli and Raja prove that the Internet can  
be the dominant, if not the sole, factor that facilitates radicalisation 
and recruitment. Some may therefore be tempted to argue that a 
completely new era of recruitment has arisen in which neither human 
contact nor physical proximity are necessary for individuals to join 
the ‘jihad’. In our view, such a conclusion would be misleading. It is 
important to emphasise that cases like Tsouli and Raja continue to 
represent a small minority compared to the many occasions on which 
the Internet is used in order to support ‘real-world’ recruitment. 
Conversely, though, ‘virtual self-recruitment’ can no longer be ignored 
simply because it does not fit with experts’ long-held assumptions 
about the salience of direct human contact and group dynamics. 
As we demonstrated, there clearly seem to be instances in which 
the sense of virtual community fostered by the Internet has been 
‘persuasive enough by itself’ to engage in ‘risky behaviour’ (see 
above), and this development needs to be taken seriously by analysts 
and policymakers. In general, the Internet is likely to become one of 
203 Lia, ‘Al Qaeda Online’.          
204 Sageman, ‘Understanding Terror’, p. 163.   
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the key ‘battlegrounds’ for European policymakers in countering the 
growth of Islamist militant recruitment. As the next chapter shows,  
it is also one of the most difficult to tackle.    
 
In this report, we have presented a comprehensive overview of the methods through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise their supporters and find new recruits. We have examined and analysed 
the structures and dynamics of the movement as it currently operates. 
In doing so, we have come to the following conclusions:
Islamist militant recruitment efforts have largely been driven 
underground, with little overt propagation and recruitment now 
occurring at mosques. Prisons and other places of vulnerability in 
which individuals are likely to feel lost or experience tensions continue 
to be a great cause of concern, which urgently needs to be addressed.
A variety of actors continue to be involved in propagation and 
recruitment, though radical imams have lost some influence. Activists 
are the ‘engines’ of Islamist militant recruitment. They often draw 
on recruits from so-called ‘gateway organisations’ which prepare 
individuals ideologically and socialise them into the extremist ‘milieu’.
Islamist militants skilfully exploit young Muslims’ conflicts of 
identity, especially when feeling torn between Western society and  
the ‘cultural’ Islam of their parents. Based on such cognitive openings, 
they facilitate the formation of in-groups in which frame alignment  
is achieved.
The Internet has come to play an increasingly important role. The 
main function is to support ‘real-world’ recruitment (by reinforcing 
religious and political themes; by facilitating networking; and by 
creating a climate of exaggeration). In recent years, however, new 
forms of Islamist militant online activism have emerged, which rely less 
on human contact and can be described as ‘virtual self-recruitment’. 
Even so, these developments are not uniform. We found there to 
be clear differences between countries in Southern Europe, where 
Muslim immigration is recent, and those in which the second and 
third generation of European Muslims is reaching adolescence. In 
countries where no second or third generation of European Muslims 
has yet emerged, language is less of an issue, nor is the conflict of 
identity between Western society and traditional culture as pivotal 
as in countries like Britain and France. As a consequence, Islamist 
militants in countries like Spain are less likely to attract converts, and 
extremist cells of mixed ethnic backgrounds are rare (though there 
are some indications that this might be changing).211 In our view, this 
also explains why the phenomenon of the ‘radical imam’, which tends 
to appeal more to converts and second or third generation European 
Muslims, has been less pronounced in Southern countries.
Across Europe, the environment in which Islamist militants operate 
has changed. Especially after the attacks in Madrid and London 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively, open recruitment has become more 
difficult. The authorities and many Muslim communities have 
become more vigilant and willing to confront extremism, yet there 
are no indications at all that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed 
211 Spanish official 3, interviewed September 2007.
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away. Based on these observations, we believe that the trend towards 
‘seekers’ and ‘home-grown’ self-starter groups will continue, especially 
in countries with a large second and third generation European 
Muslim population. We also predict that, given the constraints now 
faced by Islamist militants in the ‘open’ environment, the significance 
of the Internet as a ‘virtual’ recruitment place will grow, with some of 
the new forms of Islamist militant activism described above becoming 
more frequent.  
What can be done? In outlining our policy recommendations, 
it is useful to differentiate between short term measures aimed at 
curbing recruitment, and long term measures directed at addressing 
the ‘strains’ which may provide the breeding ground of grievances in 
which mobilisation can become effective. 
Short term measures, therefore, are policies that have a disruptive 
effect on recruitment efforts but are unlikely to affect the underlying 
dynamics and structures that drive recruitment. Among these, we 
consider the following to be the most important:
Of vital importance is to prevent the emergence of ‘recruitment 
magnets’ which allow ‘seekers’ and ‘self-starter cells’ to find ‘links 
to the jihad’ and deepen their involvement in the Islamist militant 
movement. ‘Recruitment magnets’ can be fixed physical locations, 
such as ‘radical mosques’ or ‘radical bookshops’, but the term also 
refers to ‘radical imams’ who travel around the country. Where 
‘recruitment magnets’ cannot be dealt with without incurring the risk 
of turning the radicals into ‘martyrs’, access should be made difficult. 
In extreme cases, such as Finsbury Park Mosque prior to 2004, the 
short-term drawbacks of decisive action may well be cancelled out 
by long-term benefits. Indeed, a ‘zero tolerance’ policy will not only 
curb recruitment, but also send a strong and consistent message that 
racism and incitement to violence will not be tolerated in European 
democracies. When accompanied by a communication strategy  
that clearly distinguishes between extremists and the vast majority  
of moderates, it may even be welcomed by mainstream  
Muslim communities.
Governments need to pay urgent attention to the situation in 
European prisons, which are likely to become major hubs for the 
radicalisation and recruitment efforts into Islamist militancy. Some 
of the difficulties in addressing the challenge have been outlined in 
Chapter 3. A system of ‘certified imams’ is difficult to implement, 
but a viable solution may well be identified in collaboration with 
mainstream Muslim faith leaders.212 More fundamentally even, 
there needs to be heavy investment in training and staff, so that 
radicalisation and recruitment can be recognised. 
Intelligence and law enforcement strategies need to be geared 
towards identifying the ‘activist’ leaders of cells rather than their 
followers. Activists are the ones ‘who makes things happen’, and it is 
they who pursue the expansion of cells, be it through their charisma 
and leadership or as a result of systematic low-level recruitment. 
Activists, however, are also vulnerable, because they are likely to be 
the most vocal members of their cells, who take part in the life of the 
wider community and are known by outsiders. In that sense, they 
represent the ‘weakest link’ of grassroots jihadism against  
which counter-recruitment efforts are most likely to pay off. 
Governments need to tackle the challenge posed by gateway 
organisations, and they need to be clear and consistent in doing so. 
Organisations which approve of, incite or justify violence – whether 
at home or abroad – should never be seen as allies in counter-
recruitment. Purely religious organisations, such as the Tabligh or some 
non-violent Salafi groups, may be helpful in facilitating grassroots 
counter-radicalisation programmes and providing the religious 
arguments through which to counter the extremists’ interpretations 
of jihad. Even so, governments should resist the temptation of turning 
them into ‘official spokespeople’ for the Muslim community. In no 
European countries do they represent mainstream Muslims, nor 
should European governments be seen to promote rigid faith practices 
which may prevent Muslims from becoming full and active citizens of 
Western democracies.
More attention needs to be paid to extremist activities on the 
Internet. Governments need to become as Internet savvy as the 
extremists they are meant to counter, which requires investment in 
staff and technical capacity. Initiatives aimed at monitoring extremist 
activities on the net are important and welcome, but governments 
should not shy away from taking disruptive action where necessary.  
It has become a cliché to say that no extremist site can be taken down 
for long213, but de-stabilising the extremist Internet ‘architecture’ 
– in particular distributor sites and large web forums – may produce 
valuable short-term gains. Also, the Internet may be difficult to 
regulate, but the successes in curbing the distribution of other 
‘undesirable’ materials, such as child pornography, may hold valuable 
lessons for the fight against ‘jihadism online’.     
The long-term measures proposed in the following are meant to 
address the dynamics that underlie the recruitment and mobilisation 
processes which we have observed. They are aimed at tackling some 
of the ‘strains’ which produce grievances that are exploited by Islamist 
militants in their efforts at mobilisation. As a result, they will take 
more time to effect, but they are crucial in undermining the successful 
activation of support for the Islamist militant movement:
Mainstream Muslim communities, especially in places where 
there is a second or third generation of European Muslims need 
to be re-vitalised and empowered. Islamist militants exploit the 
generational conflicts in Muslims communities, and they capitalise on 
their apparent lack of social capital. Mainstream community leaders 
need to be supported – politically and through economic incentives 
– in building social capital, for instance by providing more effective 
mechanisms for local democracy and accountability, as well as leisure 
activities and educational opportunities for young people.
Law enforcement agencies need to build and/or re-establish trust 
with Muslim communities. All to often, the police and other agents 
of the state are viewed as repressive instruments even by mainstream 
Muslim communities, who worry that all Muslims are being targeted 
212 In this respect, positive lessons may be learned from Middle Eastern countries in which programmes aimed at ‘reforming’  
radical inmates seem to have been successful.
213 See, for example, Johnny Ryan, Countering	Militant	Islamist	Radicalisation	on	the	Internet:	A	User	Driven	Strategy	to	Recover	the	Web 
(Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, 2007), Chapter 2.    
Page 58 Page 59
as potential terrorists. Government agencies need to make it clear that 
they are on the side of the decent, law-abiding majority. This requires 
concerted efforts to communicate and explain seemingly ‘repressive’ 
actions to moderate community leaders. It also calls for the creation of 
long-term, local ‘engagement’ strategies through which relationships 
based on personal trust can be cultivated. Most importantly, it means 
that law enforcement agencies should always consider ‘community 
impact’ in the planning and implementation of operations.
Schools need to play a more prominent role in countering the 
violent extremists’ efforts to gain support and find recruits. With the 
average age of recruits falling, it is vital for schools to take a leading 
role in educating their students about the narratives used by violent 
extremists as well as the ways in which they are likely to be drawn into 
their circles. In doing so, schools should provide platforms in which 
issues likely to be raised by violent extremists are discussed openly, 
questions and contradictions are highlighted, and alternative courses  
of action are pointed out. 
A similar effort is required on the Internet. Johnny Ryan’s idea of 
building ‘cultural intelligence’ that can be used to confront extremist 
narratives on Islamist militant web sites may not be feasible even 
in the medium to long term,214 but there is no question that ‘taking 
down’ extremist sites represents no viable solution in the long run 
either. Young European Muslims need to be able to engage with 
appealing European language web content that addresses their issues 
and conflicts, provides a prism though which to examine extremist 
narratives critically, and – more generally – gives them a clear sense 
of collective direction without being patronising. None of this can be 
imposed through government initiatives alone, but governments can 
offer incentives and encouragement for such initiatives.
Naturally, there are potential tensions between the short and long 
term measures presented here. Short term measures can be important 
in preventing immediate danger, but only long term measures will 
address the structural factors that underlie the problem. Furthermore, 
in the case of Islamist militancy, even longer term measures aimed at 
resolving the drivers of recruitment will not bear fruit unless the  
causes of radicalisation are successfully addressed. 
In line with the guidelines issued by the King’s College London Research Ethics Committee, all interviewees received assurances that their identity would not be revealed. However, we were given 
permission to include the following information in this report. 
It needs to be pointed out that – when dealing with radicals and/or 
former radicals – we had no means of verifying the information given. 
In some cases, interviewees refused to reveal information about their 
occupational status.
Radicals and/or former radicals
Format: age; stated residence; occupation (at time  
of interview); period of activity
France
1) 24; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
2) 27; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
3) 26; Paris (suburbs); administrator; ongoing
4) 32; Paris; not known; ongoing
5) 24; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
6) 30; Paris; unemployed; ongoing
Spain
1) 30; Madrid (suburbs); shopkeeper; ongoing
2) 32; Madrid (suburbs); labourer; ongoing
3) 37; Madrid (suburbs); unemployed; early 2000s
4) 22; Madrid (suburbs); student; ongoing
5) 24; Madrid (suburbs); not known; 2002-2004
6) 23; Madrid (suburbs); not known; early 2000s
United Kingdom
1) 28; Outer London; not known; 2000-2005
2) 33; Outer London; community worker; 1998-2002
3) 19; Outer London; apprentice; 2005-2007
4) 20; Outer London; unemployed; 2005- 2007
5) 31; Bradford; journalist; early 2000s
6) 32; Leeds; journalist; 2001-2005
Community leaders
France 
1) Official, La Grand Mosquée de Paris
2) Regional leader (Ile de France), Union des Organisations Islamique 
de France
3) Community worker, Seine-Saint-Denis
214 Ibid., Chapter 3. 
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Spain
1) Committee member, Centro Cultural Islamico, Madrid
2) Prayer leader, Centro Cultural Islamico, Madrid
United Kingdom
1) Chairman of Brixton Mosque, London
2) Community worker, Ilford
3) University imam, London Metropolitan University
Officials
France
1) Special advisor to the Ministry of Interior
2) Former Director, Directoire de la Surveillance du Territoire
3) Counter-terrorism official, Directoire de la Surveillance du 
Territoire
Spain
1) Former deputy Director of the Spanish foreign intelligence service
2) Special advisor to the Guardia Civil
3) Special advisor to the Spanish Ministry of the Interior
United Kingdom
1) Head of the Muslim Contact Unit, London Metropolitan Police
2) Counter-terrorism officer, West Yorkshire Police
3) Senior official, Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Home 
Office
4) Senior official, Intelligence, London Metropolitan Police
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